During the past presidential election, I proposed making Greater Taichung Taiwan’s second capital. I suggested the first step would be moving the Legislative Yuan there.
In democratic countries, sovereignty lies in the hands of the people. The legislature is Taiwan’s highest government body and should reflect that fact. However, its location is worth discussing, and should not descend into debates about whether legislators are acting out of self-interest when they propose a change of venue. I convened a cross-party committee to plan the move, to oversee issues such as the new location, the design, the allocation of the relocation budget and the actual construction.
The Legislative Yuan is currently located in the former grounds of a Japanese colonial-era high school. Apart from costing more than NT$100 million (US$3.38 million) in annual rent, its current location is actually illegal, as the grounds should be allocated for a school. Relocation becomes not a matter of whether we should do it, but how.
Another consideration is that Taiwan’s national government agencies are all in the Taipei City area, which is vulnerable to nuclear disasters. After the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant disaster in Japan, the Tokyo and Osaka governments started transferring some of Japan’s major national-level functions to Osaka to make it a “backup capital.”
The Taipei Basin would be affected by a disaster at the Jinshan Nuclear Power Plant in Shihmen District (石門) or the Guosheng Nuclear Power Plant in Wanli (萬里) — both in New Taipei City (新北市) — or even the Ma-anshan Nuclear Power Plant in Ma-anshan (馬鞍山), Pingtung County.
Aside from these concerns, a shortage of land in Taipei, as well as overcrowding, high housing costs and constraints on the quality of life are also good reasons to relocate.
Relocating government departments would place less stress on Taipei, but doing so for many government departments would be relatively complicated and problematic, not least because it would involve also relocating many civil servants.
The Legislative Yuan, however, consists of only 113 individual legislators. Also, legislators should be serving people throughout Taiwan, so the move to Greater Taichung would make sense. In addition, the Legislative Yuan only meets for about six months of the year and, with the exception of government officials who might have to go there twice a week to answer questions, legislators would not have to be tied to its location.
Even more important is the issue of rezoning national land. Taiwan has yet to address the problem of uneven development, which has caused differential development between the northern, central, southern and eastern areas, as well as an increasing urban-rural gap. Rational discussion between legislators and various sectors of society is needed to find the best possible way of reaching the greatest and most beneficial consensus on how to use the relocation of the Legislative Yuan to bring about more balanced national development.
By moving the Legislative Yuan, it would be possible to come up with ways to develop national land that benefit everyone as well as to implement government renewal. Future government agencies could also be established in areas outside Taipei. The High Speed Rail has already made one-day business trips around the nation possible, effectively making Taiwan a city-state with Greater Taichung as its city center. New times call for new ways of thinking and new action. This is the only way Taiwan can experience new development.
Lin Chia-lung is a Democratic Progressive Party legislator.
Translated by Drew Cameron
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The Hong Kong government on Monday gazetted sweeping amendments to the implementation rules of Article 43 of its National Security Law. There was no legislative debate, no public consultation and no transition period. By the time the ink dried on the gazette, the new powers were already in force. This move effectively bypassed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The rules were enacted by the Hong Kong chief executive, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security — a body shielded from judicial review and accountable only to Beijing. What is presented as “procedural refinement” is, in substance, a shift away from
Taiwan no longer wants to merely manufacture the chips that power artificial intelligence (AI). It aims to build the software, platforms and services that run on them. Ten major AI infrastructure projects, a national cloud computing center in Tainan, the sovereign language model Trustworthy AI Dialogue Engine, five targeted industry verticals — from precision medicine to smart agriculture — and the goal of ranking among the world’s top five in computing power by 2040: The roadmap from “Silicon Island” to “Smart Island” is drawn. The question is whether the western plains, where population, industry and farmland are concentrated, have the water and
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan