According to media reports, following a cross-ministerial discussion organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and coordinated by the National Security Council (NSC), the Ministry of National Defense is planning to send a navy vessel carrying counter-terrorist personnel, weapons and equipment on Taiwan’s first ever long-distance military tour. They will pass through the South China Sea as a declaration of the nation’s sovereignty over the area before continuing on to the Gulf of Aden via the Indian Ocean, where they will protect Taiwanese fishermen. The whole trip is expected to take two months.
As soon as the news broke, a defense ministry spokesperson said the issue of protecting fishermen was being discussed by the foreign ministry and that the defense ministry would handle the issue in accordance with government policy and under the direction of the NSC. The defense ministry thus neither verified the news nor offered a strong denial.
This is not the first controversy over sending warships to protect Taiwanese fishermen from pirates. In 2009, it was debated in the legislature and the defense ministry was asked to respond. On July 13 this year, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Shen Lyn-shun (沈呂巡) revealed that the foreign ministry and the defense ministry had discussed sending warships to protect fishermen. Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Legislator Lin Yu-fang (林郁方) has raised questions about sending warships to protect fishermen, saying that doing so includes concerns over the shipment of supplies to warships stationed abroad for longer periods as well as providing information on the position of pirate ships, things that are easier said than done. KMT Legislator Wu Yu-sheng (吳育昇) said that if Taiwan lacked the ability to send out warships, it could seek international assistance from countries like the US and Japan, and maybe even China, if they sent warships to the region. Chinese ships do normally offer assistance when they receive a request for help from Taiwanese ships.
China relies on its “String of Pearls,” a sea line of communication it is gradually establishing in the Indian Ocean, while the US relies on the advantages of its carrier battle groups and its base on Diego Garcia in the central Indian Ocean to carry out their respective offshore strategies. With Taiwan in the middle of tensions between the US and China, neither country wants to see the other engage in further military cooperation with Taiwan. If Taiwan independently sends military vessels deep into the Indian Ocean without being able to join the International Chamber of Commerce’s International Maritime Bureau — which would help break the system of the pirates — and obtain their anti-pirate information and reports, without being able to take part in the coordination of the anti-pirate mechanism that exists between various nations, the effects of Taiwan’s actions will be limited and it will be a risky venture. Thus, it is a very inappropriate and sensitive time to send Taiwanese vessels to the area.
Wu Lai-yu (吳來于), the captain of the fishing vessel Jih Chun Tsai No. 68, was accidentally killed by the US Navy after his ship was captured and used as a base by Somalian pirates. How would Taiwan’s navy respond if they came across a similar situation? How would they obtain information about such things? How would they make judgements based on this information? Would the same thing happen in the same way? I do not believe the Taiwanese navy will be better than the US or China in terms of armory or skills.
If Taiwan does send warships to the Indian Ocean, this would be meaningful for at least the three following reasons: First, the government would be taking clear military action, which would tell the public that it is serious about protecting their lives and property, a strong political statement. Second, this military move would be a test balloon to the US and China showing that it is necessary for Taiwan to take part in such international matters and organizations. The US and China would have to pay attention and could not try to stop Taiwan lest it be pushed into the hands of the side more willing to accept Taiwan’s move. Third, since the government has made strong demands that Taiwan’s navy be capable of providing protection as far away as the eastern Indian Ocean, this would also demonstrate that the navy has the ability to handle South China Sea disputes.
Therefore, while the move has strong political implications, the ability for practical implementation is weak and the issue should therefore be viewed as a form of offshore military exercise.
If this action is based on the electoral concerns of those in power, it would probably benefit them. By the time the ships return to Taiwan, the results of the presidential election will already be in. If the KMT remains in power, we may see a second, third and perhaps even fourth armada dispatched to the area. If the KMT loses and the Democratic Progressive Party gains power, as the opposition party, the KMT could still demand that the government continue to send ships to protect fishermen. When this happens, the defense ministry and the navy will be in serious trouble.
Wang Jyh-perng is an associate research fellow at the Association for Managing Defense and Strategies.
Translated by Drew Cameron
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
As Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu’s party won by a landslide in Sunday’s parliamentary election, it is a good time to take another look at recent developments in the Maldivian foreign policy. While Muizzu has been promoting his “Maldives First” policy, the agenda seems to have lost sight of a number of factors. Contemporary Maldivian policy serves as a stark illustration of how a blend of missteps in public posturing, populist agendas and inattentive leadership can lead to diplomatic setbacks and damage a country’s long-term foreign policy priorities. Over the past few months, Maldivian foreign policy has entangled itself in playing
A group of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers led by the party’s legislative caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (?) are to visit Beijing for four days this week, but some have questioned the timing and purpose of the visit, which demonstrates the KMT caucus’ increasing arrogance. Fu on Wednesday last week confirmed that following an invitation by Beijing, he would lead a group of lawmakers to China from Thursday to Sunday to discuss tourism and agricultural exports, but he refused to say whether they would meet with Chinese officials. That the visit is taking place during the legislative session and in the aftermath