US President Barack Obama’s administration intends to upgrade Taiwan’s existing F-16A/B aircraft instead of selling Taipei its more advanced F-16C/Ds.
Some might see this as a severe setback for Taiwan’s air defenses, but the US is approaching the issue with three distinct considerations in mind: its perspective on global strategy and security; its national interests; and security in the Taiwan Strait region. When these concerns are taken into consideration, it becomes easier to understand why the Obama administration would reach such a decision and why that decision is not entirely bad for Taiwan.
Washington’s first consideration regarding the sale was its view of global strategy and security. While Taiwanese government officials and academics might still think in terms of the military threats that existed during the Cold War era of confrontation between superpowers. Perhaps they should be thinking about the non-conventional security threats that have emerged since the early 1990s and which now pose a more serious threat.
In contrast, the main trend in the US government’s strategic and security policies since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks has been to focus more on non-conventional threats — especially that of international terrorism. Preventing terrorists from obtaining weapons of mass destruction and other weapons has long been the focus of counter-proliferation efforts in US bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.
The success of Washington’s counter-proliferation efforts depends to a large extent on cooperation from two big powers — China and Russia — so the US really does not want to risk provoking a backlash and reprisals from Beijing by selling weapons to Taiwan. From the US’ perspective, upgrading Taiwan’s F-16A/B aircraft is the best option because it minimizes the negative reaction from China.
The second point of consideration was the US’ national interests. Arms sales are a very important aspect of a country’s diplomatic policy, but security — both military and economic — is any nation’s most vital interest. Preserving security is the principal aim of diplomacy. Washington wants to protect its economic security by maintaining good relations with China, its biggest creditor nation. China and the US also have a host of economic and trade interests in common. These two factors combined are of much greater importance for US economic stability than the sale of F-16C/D aircraft.
The third and final consideration for Washington was security in the Taiwan Strait. On this issue, the US government still does worry about conventional military threats and is quite concerned about China’s military modernization and the threat to Taiwan’s security.
Every year the US Department of Defense submits to the US Congress a report entitled Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. The annual update chapter of these reports continually discusses the challenge that China’s recent military development poses to Taiwan’s deterrence capability. Other chapters detail the modernization of China’s armed forces and the reports talk about the threat that this modernization poses and how it influences the cross-strait balance of military power. The reports give more attention to Taiwan than any other country.
When deciding what weapons it would sell to Taiwan, the Obama administration by no means disregarded Taiwan’s ability to defend itself in the face of the modernization of China’s armed forces. In the Obama government’s view, selling Taipei aircaft such as F-16C/Ds would not be of much real help when the main threat to Taiwan comes from Chinese missiles. On the contrary, it would make things worse by souring US-China and China-Taiwan relations.
Washington’s first concern is to maintain peaceful relations between the US and China, and between the two sides of the Strait. If, in future, Taiwan were to face a threat to its air defense security that could be dealt with by more modern weapons, the US would still be willing to sell Taiwan newer, more advanced fighters.
The US’ point of view is that the best way to defend Taiwan’s security is by taking both diplomacy and military preparedness into account.
Lin Tsung-ta is an adjunct instructor at National Taiwan University’s Department of Political Science.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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