The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) believes the key to winning next year’s presidential election lies in Taiwan’s south and that it needs to develop a carefully and intricately structured organization to mobilize voters and take the cities and counties in the region.
Because of the personal relationships that exist in the south, opinions have a way of getting around by word-of-mouth and shaping ideology. However, the media and ideology are not the keys to determining the political strongholds of the pan-greens and pan-blues. If they were, the KMT would not have won a plurality of the votes in Chiayi, Tainan and Kaohsiung cities in 2008.
The key to the south is economics.
Strangely, although the KMT during its three years in office has introduced direct flights between Taiwan and China, opened Taiwan up to Chinese tourists and signed a cross-strait memorandum of understanding on finance and the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China, domestic regional divisions appear to have intensified even as cross-strait economic integration has grown.
The evidence for this can be seen in the way people have voted, especially in the five special municipality elections. At the same time, in the south, the economic problems resulting from deteriorating working conditions and uneven regional development are worsening.
As a result of large government subsidies, the north of the country has developed a high-tech industry and strengthened its advantages in the financial and service industries. For a long time now, agriculture in the central and southern areas of Taiwan has been used to support industry, national defense and the high-tech industry. Those in power like the latter because it has a high output value, and this is the source of Taiwan’s uneven regional development.
In addition to most banks being located in Taipei, more than 80 percent of Taiwan’s listed capital comes from the electronics sector, which is mostly concentrated in the Taipei-Hsinchu region. Northern Taiwan has also set up production points in China to make up for the growth crisis.
A concrete look at cross-strait integration shows that more than 90 percent of businesses in the Hsinchu Science Park have investments or factories in China and more than 60 percent of Taiwan-listed companies invest there, which means that the north of Taiwan and China are already largely integrated in terms of global economic development.
Using the textile industry as an example, we see that the production bases of traditional industries are mainly located in Taoyuan, Changhua, Yunlin and Tainan. However, the headquarters controlling these companies, together with most of Taiwan’s service sector, are mostly concentrated in northern Taiwan, especially in Taipei.
Sixty-eight percent of listed textile companies are located in Taipei, while only 16 percent are in Tainan. Ten percent are located in Taoyuan, 4 percent in Changhua and only 2 percent in Yunlin. Also, if we look at Kaohsiung Port, then more than 90 percent of the companies in the service industry related to shipping containers are located in Taipei.
These data highlight that the geographic division of labor in Taiwan has caused regional fragmentation, which explains why the combined profit of the Neihu and Nankang software parks in Taipei is higher than the total sum of Taiwan’s other three science and technology parks. This also shows that the service industry and white-collar companies that form the heart of national business operations are mostly concentrated in the north, while factory production and blue-collar labor is mostly confined to Taiwan’s south.
A company is the heart of any business operation and firms pay taxes in the area where their business is registered. This contributes to the tax base of that particular area and to the finances of the local government, creating a positive externality. On the other hand, factories are production bases that only provide laborers with pay, while not engaging in any operations that generate local taxes.
In the south, appalling working conditions are becoming more and more common due to the use of self-employed workers to avoid the pension system and the proliferation of temporary workers. Despite this, environmental pollution and congested traffic in areas with heavy industry, like the Siaogang (小港) and Cianjhen (前鎮) districts in Greater -Kaohsiung, cause negative economic externalities.
When external economic factors such as the ECFA hit wage-earning blue-collar factory workers in the south, workers’ benefits shrink along with GDP growth, inflation rises and real income decreases, causing the overall economic situation to deteriorate. This can be understood by imagining two people who could once afford to buy a lunchbox each but then as a result of unequal development, one of them can afford only half a lunchbox while the other can now afford two. Looked at from a macroeconomic perspective, people tend to notice 25 percent growth rates, while failing to see an economy in terminal decline.
The KMT should take responsibility for all regional economic problems. If one wishes to understand the imbalances that exist between different regions in Taiwan, all that is necessary is to compare the amount of funds and resources available each year to borough chiefs in Taipei and Greater Kaohsiung.
Beijing also understands that their “dialogue” should no longer be focused on Taipei, but rather the south of Taiwan, and that buying agricultural products should be the basis of its Taiwan policy. While China may keep talking about how much Taiwanese agricultural produce it buys, the benefits have not trickled down to farmers, because they are not the ones who benefit from China’s economic focus on southern Taiwan.
That is also why opposition to the ECFA and the “one China” market is likely to win votes in the south. The reason is simple, and to understand it, all we have to do is ask Yunlin farmers what they call wholesalers.
Wang Wen-cheng is a professor of geography at National Taiwan Normal University.
TRANSLATED BY DREW CAMERON
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s (李顯龍) decision to step down after 19 years and hand power to his deputy, Lawrence Wong (黃循財), on May 15 was expected — though, perhaps, not so soon. Most political analysts had been eyeing an end-of-year handover, to ensure more time for Wong to study and shadow the role, ahead of general elections that must be called by November next year. Wong — who is currently both deputy prime minister and minister of finance — would need a combination of fresh ideas, wisdom and experience as he writes the nation’s next chapter. The world that
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
As Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu’s party won by a landslide in Sunday’s parliamentary election, it is a good time to take another look at recent developments in the Maldivian foreign policy. While Muizzu has been promoting his “Maldives First” policy, the agenda seems to have lost sight of a number of factors. Contemporary Maldivian policy serves as a stark illustration of how a blend of missteps in public posturing, populist agendas and inattentive leadership can lead to diplomatic setbacks and damage a country’s long-term foreign policy priorities. Over the past few months, Maldivian foreign policy has entangled itself in playing