Should we use legal means to keep journalists from violating the rights of others? This has been a subject of much recent debate and many are looking forward to a constitutional interpretation from the Council of Grand Justices.
The council already gave the answer 11 years ago in Constitutional Interpretation No. 509: “In light of protecting other fundamental rights such as personal reputation and privacy and public interests as well, the freedom of speech is not an absolute right but subject to reasonable statutory restraints imposed upon the communication media.”
Although 40 years ago the US Supreme Court determined that the New York Times had the right to publish the “Pentagon Papers,” which were only fully released last week, it was not because freedom of the press was valued over national security, but because the publication of the documents would not put the country in immediate and evident danger. At the time, the Times praised the court’s decision, calling it “a ringing victory for freedom under law,” showing that the newspaper itself did not think it could override the law.
Through the Criminal Code, the Child and Youth Welfare Act (兒童及少年福利法) and the Social Order Maintenance Act (社會秩序維護法), Taiwanese society has tried to deal with a media sector lacking self-control and to regulate it using legal and other restraints. In reality — whether they are producing fabricated reports, crime news reports or paparazzi photography — if journalists followed their professional ethics, they would not violate other people’s rights and even if they did do so occasionally, there would be potential for improvement if they could maintain a measure of self-discipline.
However, accurate and fair reporting remains rare. Not only is self-discipline not part of the mainstream of journalism, some media outlets have even made the violation of rights part of how they make a profit, and they still refuse to reform their ways and apologize even when a court rules against them.
When dealing with media outlets that refuse to recognize the need for self-regulation, the only other avenue open to civic groups and individuals working for children’s rights is to demand that media behavior be legally regulated.
As always, some media outlets rehash the cliches about how any kind of legal restrictions, including lawsuits, are evil tricks aimed at restricting press freedom. This may be a realistic portrayal of the media’s current almighty status, but the public has had enough of the chaos that comes from media outlets using the public’s “right to know” as an excuse for pursuing their own profits.
Faced with a media sector devoid of professional ethics that claims press freedom overrides all other concerns, we must not allow them to ignore both self-regulation and legal regulations.
Lu Shih-hsiang is an adviser to the Taipei Times.
TRANSLATED BY KATHERINE WeI
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