The Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Tuesday lodged a “strong protest” with the Philippines over a ruling in its Court of Appeals which, citing the “one China” policy, upheld the Philippine Bureau of Immigration’s decision to deport 14 Taiwanese fraud suspects to China.
Aside from sending the protest via telegraph to Manila, Minister of Foreign Affairs Timothy Yang (楊進添) said he had on Monday told Philippine Representative to Taiwan Antonio Basilio that “the ruling was unacceptable to Taiwan,” warning that “we will not exclude any possible measures of protest.” So the foreign minister shows that he can talk tough. But how seriously does the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government think the Philippine government will take Taiwan’s complaint in light of the previous objection lodged by the foreign ministry, which ended with Taiwan wimping out?
In February, the KMT government’s protest against Manila’s decision to deport the 14 suspects to China appeared stern in its demand of a formal apology from the Philippines. It also recalled Taiwan’s representative to Manila and imposed a four-month freeze on Philippine nationals coming to Taiwan to work. Just as Taiwan’s public was about to laud the administration under President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) for finally showing some backbone by sticking up for Taiwan’s dignity, however, the Ma government softened its stance. Following a visit by Philippine presidential envoy Manuel Roxas, who did not meet Taipei’s demand for an apology, the foreign ministry suggested that the punitive actions taken by the Philippine government against its officials involved in the deportation would be interpreted by Taipei as “a kind of apology,” hence putting a stop to the row with the Philippines.
Truly pathetic. Considering the way Taiwan’s demand for an apology ended then, how convincing is the Ma administration now when it expects the public to believe that it truly would uphold Taiwan’s authority and dignity with its latest so-called “stern protest”?
Addressing a group of foreign panelists at this year’s International Law Association Asia-Pacific Regional Conference in Taipei yesterday, Ma gave himself a pat on the back that his administration’s ostensible efforts to ease cross-strait tensions have helped expand Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, again trumpeting his principle of “mutual non--recognition of each other’s sovereignty and mutual non-denial of each other’s jurisdiction” with regard to China.
However, if Ma believes that his so-called “mutual non-denial” principle has helped Taiwan gain more breathing room in the international community, why is it that all Taiwanese see is repeated denials of the Republic of China (ROC)? From the recent disclosure of an internal WHO memo that affirmed its denigration of Taiwan’s status to a “province of China,” to the visa exemptions from Croatia and Slovenia — which, respectively, refer to Taiwan as “Taiwan, People’s Republic of China (PRC)” and place it under the category “China” along with Hong Kong and Macau — to the latest decision by the Philippines’ Court of Appeals upholding the “one China” principle in its ruling, seem like a series of affirmations recognizing the PRC. All the while, the Ma administration has dismissed the ROC’s sovereignty and dignity on the international stage.
Can Ma enlighten Taiwan’s public on how exactly his “mutual non-denial” principle plays out to Taiwan’s benefit? Thus far, it appears that Ma is living in a bubble of his own made up of naivety and a false sense of thawing cross-strait relations.
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