A few days ago, 14 Taiwanese suspected of fraud were deported to China by the Philippine government. The news immediately set off a storm of protests in Taiwan and because the deportation has touched on politically sensitive cross-strait issues, in particular in relation to issues of sovereignty and legal jurisdiction, the public and the media in Taiwan, the Philippines and China have taken a great interest. This situation will be a great test of the political skills of the three governments involved, and, because politics is not necessarily a zero-sum game, it might even result in a win-win situation.
The fact is that this alleged fraud case did not occur a few days ago. On Dec. 28, news reports detailed a large cross-border fraud ring involving Internet and telephone scams in China, the Philippines and Taiwan. The reports were not picked up by Taiwanese media outlets and it wasn’t until the Taiwanese suspects were deported to China that Taiwan’s media and government began to pay any attention.
Why? Was it because the Taiwanese government and media outlets didn’t think it important or was it because staff at Taiwan’s representative office and representatives of Taiwan’s intelligence agencies stationed in the Philippines were not paying attention? Why were there no news reports until the suspects were deported? Here are some of my thoughts.
First, there was not sufficient cooperation between the many different Taiwanese representative offices operating in the Philippines. Many government agencies have offices in the Philippines. In addition to Criminal Investigation Bureau (CIB) officials, there is also the National Immigration Agency and diplomatic units. The question remains if all these agencies are able to cooperate and this has to do with the longstanding division of responsibilities in the bureaucratic system.
A look at the domestic situation shows that the National Security Bureau (NSB), the Ministry of Justice’s Investigation Bureau, the district prosecutors’ offices and the National Police Administration, including the CIB and all police precincts, are all in charge of public order. Before the NSB was legally regulated, its command and “integrative” powers were far reaching. The NSB’s powers were weakened after the agency was legally regulated, but the complementary mechanisms and the mechanisms that took over these responsibilities were not sound. As a result, the organization could not make full use of all its functions, which brings us to the next point.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ representative office cannot effectively negotiate or integrate different issues. In theory, its official duties are to maintain diplomatic relations with the host government, in this case the Philippine government. However, in practice, because of issues such as the organization’s functions, division of labor or systemic factors, representative offices place more weight on establishing political relationships, such as with lawmakers or politically appointed officials.
These offices are not in charge of public order or -intelligence-related issues, nor is it their expertise. That is why, unless such issues involve overtly political aspects, the top officials at representatives office will not do much to interfere. It is also the reason why it is difficult for the representative office in Manila to bring about effective compromise or integration in the present situation. This brings us to the third point.
Not enough weight is given to the relationship between Taiwan and the Philippines. Although the Philippines is only about one hour away by airplane and so should be a very important neighbor, a look at the political situation in Taiwan shows that because Manila is not a regional heavyweight in terms of political and economic power, it does not carry much political clout.
The result is that Taiwan’s relationship with the Philippines does not receive special attention. If an urgent or unexpected situation that must be handled through diplomatic channels occurs in the relationship between the two countries, chances are that the results will be limited, in particular if the “obstacles” posed by the cross-strait relationship are taken into consideration.
Taipei has issued a strong protest against Manila’s actions and it has also initiated negotiations with Beijing through the cross-strait mechanism for legal cooperation in the hope that China will make a show of good will and return the Taiwanese suspects for trial in Taiwan in accordance with international law. It is clear that this is no longer only a diplomatic issue with political and public order implications between Taiwan and the Philippines, it also poses a new challenge to cross-strait relations.
If the suspects are not returned to Taiwan, that would make it clear that Beijing does not respect the sovereignty of the Taiwanese judiciary and it could also affect any further deepening of cross-strait cooperation and the development of mutual trust across the Taiwan Strait.
If, on the other hand, this incident could be used to establish a mechanism for deeper and more far reaching judicial cooperation between Taiwan and China, it could help create a win-win situation. Such a mechanism could be modeled on Interpol and let police from Taiwan, China and maybe even other countries establish permanent informal channels for communication, negotiations and cooperation.
This is the only way to resolve or handle similar future issues or issues that may develop from other urgent incidents.
Yang Yung-nane is director of National Cheng Kung University’s Department of Political Science.
TRANSLATED BY PERRY SVENSSON
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