Once you put together the details of an important crime, namely motives, weapons (if any), timelines and the relations between the parties involved, you can almost get the whole picture of what happened, making it possible to hold the real perpetrator responsible. Every one of the elements mentioned above is of equal importance in establishing the whole truth. There can be no truth if questions in any one of those areas remain unanswered.
This is particularly true in terms of the election-eve shooting of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Central Committee Member Sean Lien (連勝文), a son of former KMT chairman and vice president Lien Chan (連戰), on Nov. 26.
A large amount of public disbelief remains concerning the details of the case after Banciao prosecutors failed to account for some important elements of the crime before they completed their probe into the shooting, indicted alleged shooter Lin Cheng-wei (林正偉) and sought the death penalty on Friday.
Prosecutors attributed the shooting to a financial dispute between New Taipei City Councilor Chen Hung-yuan’s (陳鴻源) father and Lin over a land deal in 1992 and added that Chen was Lin’s real target, not Sean Lien.
This argument was based largely on the suspect’s statement, but how credible is the word of a man who backtracked on his own statement shortly after he was indicted?
If the history between Chen’s father and the suspect went back nearly two decades, as Lin alleges, then why does Chen’s family deny any acquaintance with the man?
Moreover, why did the suspect mistake Lien for Chen if there was a history between Chen’s family and the suspect?
Did prosecutors look into the alleged relationship and the land deal, which, according to the suspect, was the root cause of the shooting, before concluding the investigation?
Prosecutors last month named Chen’s campaign headquarters director Tu Yi-kai (杜義凱) as a key witness because Lin called Tu three times just minutes before he allegedly pulled the trigger, but they did not account for Tu’s role in the case, nor did they explain what the suspect had intended to tell Tu if the calls had gone through.
What disappointed the public the most was the prosecutors ending their probe before identifying the source of the weapon — a SIG Sauer P220 pistol.
Prosecutors discovered the gun, manufactured in 1995, was originally registered under the name of a Filipino man living in California, but that the man said the firearm was stolen by his cousin after it was smuggled back to the Philippines sometime between 1999 and 2000. The suspect claimed that he acquired the gun from a late local gangster about 11 to 12 years ago.
It is puzzling to see prosecutors conclude their investigation into the source of the gun despite the fact that Lin failed to pass polygraph tests regarding the weapon on three occasions and was obviously protecting whoever put it in his hand.
Indeed, it may take months or even years to find out how an expensive pistol ended up in the hand of a man who has only NT$4,000 in his bank accounts.
However, this could well be the key both to breaking the case and to prosecutors presenting a much more compelling argument to prove that the shooting was a one-man job.
Prosecutors need to put together a solid case against Lin if they want to stop people from making wild guesses and to ensure the death penalty is not being used to cover up some as yet hidden truth.
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