In the field of international relations, there is a theory called “domestic audience cost.” According to this theory, the political leaders of a country might send out signals to intensify a conflict with an enemy state in the hope that this will function as a deterrent to the state in question. This is risky, however, because if they then pull back once conflict intensifies, they run the risk of disappointing their domestic audience. The cost of that could affect their political standing.
In democracies, the domestic audience cost is evaluated in regular elections where voters can punish those leaders that have disappointed them through their ballots. In authoritarian countries, however, there are no regular elections to highlight domestic audience cost.
According to the theory, as the risk of conflict intensifies, democratic states are better than non-democratic states at clearly conveying a credible deterrent.
The domestic audience cost analysis is generally used to explain the domestic effect encountered by political leaders during ongoing conflicts and their understanding of the intentions of the leaders of the enemy state.
Simply put, because of the higher degree of transparency in democratic states there are more effective restraints on the power of political leaders, and this makes it easier for their opponents to see their intentions.
If the political leaders in a democracy send out signals that will lead to the intensification of a conflict, those statements will inevitably create a domestic reaction. That reaction will quickly make the statements of political leaders self--fulfilling, and as such, must be taken seriously.
By comparison, the domestic audience cost is lower in events aimed at creating peace. If a leader in a democratic country expresses a wish to create peace with a belligerent state, but later regrets having done so, some domestic peace proponents might criticize the leader’s moral rectitude, but generally speaking, the strength of their condemnation might not be as strong as the support from those who are in favor of a more hawkish stance, particularly if the democratic state in question is under threat.
How believable is it if a non-democratic state sends out signals that it wants peace?
Non-democratic states are not transparent and there are no restraints on their powers. This makes it very likely that people would doubt claims that they are interested in peace.
To go one step further, if political leaders in an authoritarian state retreat from a claim that they want peace and instead move in a more hawkish direction, that creates almost no domestic reaction because in such a state people are more likely to hold a jingoistic attitude toward the outside world. Peace activists will find it very difficult to make their voices heard in such a state.
Further, if this non-democratic state is threatening another state, any promise of peace should be met with even more skepticism. For the leaders of a non-democratic state, therefore, the domestic audience cost of retreating from a call for peace will be lower than in a democratic state and lower than if they step back from a promise to increase the tension in a conflict.
It will also be lower than it would be in a state that is under threat.
This means that a move toward peace by a non-democratic state that is also threatening another state is the least credible of all.
This theory provides a clear explanation of why Chinese official Jiang Ping’s (江平) statements at the Tokyo Film Festival triggered such a vehement response in Taiwan so quickly. It also explains why China’s promises to Taiwan of peace are always met with suspicion and expectations that it has ulterior motives.
In terms of cross-strait relations, precisely because Taiwan is a democratic state and China is not, and precisely because Taiwan is under threat, but China is not, the domestic audience cost for any promise of peace on behalf of China will be extremely low. This is why it is so difficult for China’s political leaders to win the trust of the Taiwanese public no matter how hard they try and no matter how many concessions they may make in Taiwan’s favor.
Hsu Szu-chien is an assistant research fellow in the provisional office of Academia Sinica’s Institute of Political Science.
TRANSLATED BY PERRY SVENSSON
There has been much catastrophizing in Taiwan recently about America becoming more unreliable as a bulwark against Chinese pressure. Some of this has been sparked by debates in Washington about whether the United States should defend Taiwan in event of conflict. There also were understandable anxieties about whether President Trump would sacrifice Taiwan’s interests for a trade deal when he sat down with President Xi (習近平) in late October. On top of that, Taiwan’s opposition political leaders have sought to score political points by attacking the Lai (賴清德) administration for mishandling relations with the United States. Part of this budding anxiety
The diplomatic dispute between China and Japan over Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s comments in the Japanese Diet continues to escalate. In a letter to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, China’s UN Ambassador Fu Cong (傅聰) wrote that, “if Japan dares to attempt an armed intervention in the cross-Strait situation, it would be an act of aggression.” There was no indication that Fu was aware of the irony implicit in the complaint. Until this point, Beijing had limited its remonstrations to diplomatic summonses and weaponization of economic levers, such as banning Japanese seafood imports, discouraging Chinese from traveling to Japan or issuing
On Nov. 8, newly elected Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) and Vice Chairman Chi Lin-len (季麟連) attended a memorial for White Terror era victims, during which convicted Chinese Communist Party (CCP) spies such as Wu Shi (吳石) were also honored. Cheng’s participation in the ceremony, which she said was part of her efforts to promote cross-strait reconciliation, has trapped herself and her party into the KMT’s dark past, and risks putting the party back on its old disastrous road. Wu, a lieutenant general who was the Ministry of National Defense’s deputy chief of the general staff, was recruited
Tokyo-Beijing relations have been rapidly deteriorating over the past two weeks as China tries to punish Japan over Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks about Taiwan earlier this month, and the off-ramp to this conflict is yet to be seen. Takaichi saying that a “Taiwan contingency” could cause a “situation threatening Japan’s survival” — which would allow Japan to act in self-defense — has drawn Beijing’s ire and sparked retaliatory measures. Her remark did not gain public attention until Chinese Consul General in Osaka Xue Jian (薛劍) made an apparent threat to behead her. The two sides lodged protests against each
RSS