Perhaps in response to criticisms in the Japanese media following recent tensions over the disputed Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台), earlier this month the Government Information Office (GIO) issued a press statement to overseas news correspondents in Taiwan entitled The Republic of China’s stand on the Diaoyutai Islands Question.
The press release attempted to explain the position of the Republic of China (ROC) as follows: “The mainland remains within our country’s ‘existing national boundaries’ as affirmed under Article 4 of the Constitution. In other words, the mainland remains within the constitutionally defined territory of the Republic of China. So of course we cannot voice any disagreement with the mainland authorities’ claim that the Diaoyutai Islands are China’s national territory.”
The statement also says that Taiwan will “regularly dispatch additional coast guard patrol vessels” to waters around the Diaoyutais to protect Taiwanese fishing boats, and will expel or detain and penalize Chinese fishing boats, and those of “other countries and areas,” that enter Taiwan’s territorial waters to fish illegally.
Such a statement is absurd not only in the way the policy was announced, but also with regard to how it would be implemented. For the sake of Taiwan’s national interest, President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) government must retract this foolish and dangerous statement.
Most unforgivable is the fact that, while the GIO apparently only issued a Chinese-language version of the statement, it distributed it exclusively to the foreign media. For some reason, it did not provide the same text to Taiwanese news outlets.
Did the GIO intentionally deprive Taiwanese readers and viewers of their right to know? Is it afraid that the public might question the wisdom of this policy? Or does it have some other kind of unspoken ulterior motive? At a time when Chinese military power is on the rise and the US and Japan are working to strengthen their defensive and deterrent capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, for whose benefit is Ma’s government taking this two-faced approach, saying one thing to outsiders and another to its own people?
Why do we say that this policy is foolish and dangerous? First let us consider the way the policy was announced. The government says that, while there are territorial conflicts over the Diaoyutais between China and Japan and between Taiwan and Japan, there is no such conflict between Taiwan and China. Taiwan should tell Japan that the Diaoyutais are our national territory, the government says, but there is no need to object to China’s claim to sovereignty over the islands, because according to Article 4 of the Constitution, China lies within our “existing national boundaries.”
If this twisted notion were indeed true, then, according to the Constitution, Chinese fishermen would be citizens of the “mainland area” of the ROC.
However, the government statement also says that “the Republic of China will expel or detain and penalize mainland fishing boats that fish within the overlapping economic waters of Taiwan and Japan.”
A government exists to protect the country’s citizens, so what rationale could it have for expelling its own people from its own economic waters?
Besides, if Chinese fishermen are indeed citizens of the “mainland area of the ROC,” then last month, when the skipper of a trawler registered in Jinjiang port in China’s Fujian Province was arrested and detained by Japan, the ROC government should have been duty-bound to come to his assistance and make urgent diplomatic -representations on his behalf.
Why, then, did our government not lift a finger or say a word in the captain’s defense? Why did it leave him to fend for himself in Okinawa? If Chinese fishermen are really citizens of the “mainland area of the ROC,” why has the ROC coast guard always expelled Chinese fishermen who attempt to catch fish around Kinmen and Matsu? How could these fishermen be said to have “crossed the border?”
More contradictory still is the recent situation in which two vessels belonging to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) fisheries authorities escorted Chinese fishing boats into waters near the Diaoyutais and got involved in a confrontation with Japanese coast guard patrol vessels.
If the Chinese mainland really lies within our “existing national boundaries” and if, therefore, we have no territorial conflict with the government established within those boundaries, but only with Japan, then why didn’t the ROC navy rush to the scene of the confrontation to chase off the Japanese boats and protect our sovereignty?
If there really is no conflict between the ROC’s and PRC’s respective claims to the Diaoyutais, then what exactly is the relationship between the ROC and the PRC? And why does the Ma administration keep buying weapons from the US to resist the PRC?
The next question relates to whether the government can put its declared policy into practice. The government says it will send additional coast guard patrol vessels to protect fishing boats in waters around the Diaoyutais, and expel or detain and penalize trawlers from Japan or other countries that fish in the area. You’d have to be pretty naive to believe that.
If the Ma administration really means to do as it says, it will have to be prepared for military conflict with Japan. No matter what size coast guard boat Taiwan sends, it would be like bashing our head on a rock. The crew had better be ready to sacrifice their lives for the sake of the nation, because our side would be certain to lose. The only way to have a chance of winning would be to dispatch navy ships and air force planes to back up the coast guard with their combined firepower.
The US and Japan are planning to hold joint naval maneuvers near the Diaoyutais following next month’s APEC meeting. Perhaps the Ma administration would like to join in the maneuvers, playing the role of a potential enemy. Then we would find out whether our forces would be wiped out entirely in the event of a real clash. We had better make sure our armed forces can stand their ground before Ma goes ahead with his plan to send extra coast guard patrols to protect our fishermen.
Moreover, what exactly is meant by “regularly?” How often would that be? How many ships would be involved? Now that the government has announced its intention to organize such patrols, Taiwanese and overseas media will be watching.
Right-wing organizations bent on upholding our sovereignty over the Diaoyutais, encouraged by the government, may wish to send boats to the islands. With elections approaching, some politicians would certainly like to put themselves in the limelight by joining in such activities. If our government is mature enough to mean what it says, it had better be ready to deal with any eventuality. If the Cabinet has a plan of action it ought to tell the legislature exactly how it intends to handle such a situation.
Why is the government’s position so contradictory and impractical? Put simply, because the Ma administration picks and chooses where and when it is willing to uphold our sovereignty. It is overly focused on confronting Japan, but bends over backwards to avoid upsetting China. No one is quite sure what exactly the “Republic of China” is, and people do not know where their loyalties are supposed to lie.
That being the case, why release such a statement at all? There are two possible reasons. One is that the government doesn’t really care about our claim over the Diaoyutais, but is driven by anti-Japanese sentiment. The other is that the ROC has already surrendered to the PRC. What is the real reason?
The government is responsible for the country’s foreign policy, so it should give the public a clear explanation of what it is up to.
TRANSLATED BY JULIAN CLEGG
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