In 1996, China threatened Taiwan by launching weeklong missile tests off its coastline, designed to intimidate Taiwanese and influence the presidential election. Even though China warned the US that any intervention to defend Taiwan could lead to war and possibly even a nuclear exchange, Washington unflinchingly dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups to protect Taiwan, demonstrating its commitment to the region. It is worth noting that one of the carriers, the USS Nimitz, sailed through the Taiwan Strait.
However, 14 years after the Taiwan Strait Crisis, the security situation in Northeast Asia is markedly different.
The US and South Korea recently held a joint naval exercise, mobilizing 8,000 troops, 20 ships and submarines — including the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington and 200 planes — in the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan in response to the torpedoing of a South Korean naval ship, believed by the US and South Korea to be the work of Pyongyang.
Although the US has said that the maneuvers were aimed at sending a strong message to Pyongyang that aggression will not be tolerated, China, North Korea’s adamant supporter, has strongly protested the drills, saying its national interest will be damaged if a US aircraft carrier is deployed in the Yellow Sea, which it views as its “backyard.”
Instead of ignoring these objections, the US made an unprecedented strategic U-turn, deciding to relocate some of the drills away from the sensitive Yellow Sea to the Sea of Japan. Moreover, the aircraft carrier USS George Washington will not now enter the Yellow Sea. This conciliatory gesture not only shocked many security experts in South Korea and Japan, but also carries implications for Taiwan.
Clearly, China’s increasingly assertive posture toward the Western Pacific has significantly shifted the military status quo that has been maintained in Northeast Asia since World War II. Ten Chinese naval ships violated Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around Okinawa in April, another two warships passed close to Okinawa on their way to the Pacific early this month and Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi (楊潔篪) criticized US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s remarks at the ASEAN Regional Forum about resolving disputes in the South China Sea multilaterally as an “attack” on China. Beijing’s strong words and “saber-rattling” perfectly reflect its mindset.
Even though under international law it is legitimate for the US and South Korea to conduct military drills in international waters, Beijing believes this could threaten its sovereignty and therefore considers it unacceptable. Accordingly, China is now a pivotal consideration for the US when planning maneuvers in the area. Moreover, by backing off the US might well embolden China to take further action that radically alters the balance of power in Northeast Asia.
The US has repeatedly expressed its concerns over China’s rapid military modernization and lack of transparency, as Beijing’s relentless development of anti-satellite capabilities, quieter submarines, sophisticated mines and particularly the latest anti-ship ballistic missiles — known as “carrier killers” — constitute a credible and physical threat to its neighbors. As China’s economy continues to grow over the coming decade, its military capabilities will become ever more of a concern.
Nowhere is this dramatic change in the security situation more daunting than Taiwan. If a 1996-type crisis happens again, the possibility of outside help would be quite slim, given the US’ new found sensitivitiy to China’s sensibilities, however unreasonable.
For a small country situated between great powers, like Taiwan, it is a good idea to hedge one’s bets by maintaining good relations with Beijing and the US. However, with China accounting for nearly half of Taiwan’s exports, the two economies likely to become increasingly integrated and China’s continued territorial ambitions toward Taiwan, it is clear which side has the advantage.
To prevent the situation from deteriorating further, Taiwan needs to strengthen its ties with security partners like the US and Japan. More importantly, its current pro-China policy needs to change now before it is too late.
Ho-ting Tu is a journalist and writer based in Taipei and also a researcher of cross-strait relations and US foreign policy.
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