President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) on Tuesday called for the establishment of an anti-corruption commission. Such a move was warranted, he said, to combat graft and meet public demands for clean government. He added that success depended on the resolve of government leaders, and therein lies the problem.
Ma is the head of a government, as well as a political party, that has long fought legislative efforts to battle corruption and enact necessary sunshine laws. The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) — both in and out of power — has persistently dragged its feet on judicial reform. In addition, Ma wants the commission to be a unit of the Ministry of Justice, instead of being independent.
His proposal appears to be mostly smoke and mirrors, especially since he and Minister of Justice Tseng Yung-fu (曾勇夫) appear to differ on the agency’s mission. Ma’s inability to enact internal reforms in the KMT does not inspire much confidence either.
However, as the establishment of such an agency will require the approval of both the Executive Yuan and the legislature, there is plenty of time to work out the details. If Ma and the Cabinet are serious about rooting out corruption, they should take the time to do it right. This must involve brainstorming with legal experts and the opposition. The downside for the administration, of course, is that it would receive advice that it would not like.
In the interests of being helpful, there are three sources we suggest that Ma and his planners consult: the 2004 World Bank report Anti-Corruption Commissions, Panacea or Real Medicine to Fight Corruption?; the recommendations of the 1999 National Conference on Judicial Reform; and members of the Judicial Reform Foundation — the latter two would be especially useful as Ma’s anti-corruption stance stems from the recent scandal engulfing the judiciary.
John Heilbrunn, author of the bank report, said anti-corruption agencies have often failed to reduce corruption because they are aimed more at placating calls for reform than taking real action and because political leaders are averse to enacting reforms that could hurt cronies or constituents who benefit from corruption. These agencies are often little more than paper tigers because, he said, they lack the remit, budget or staff to be truly effective and serve largely to divert attention from other reforms, or worse, they become tools “to repress political rivals … or previous governments become targets of investigation.”
Heilbrunn said there are four key factors to ensuring the effectiveness of an anti-corruption agency: giving it the legal tools to pursue corrupt officials and the mandate to enforce such laws; independence from political leadership; a clear reporting hierarchy to ensure transparency; and an oversight committee to both control potential excesses, such as the persecution of political opponents and to limit political interference in agency operations.
As for fixing the judiciary, some of the recommendations of the July 1999 conference have been implemented, such as the revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure (刑事訴訟法) in 2003, which incorporated the presumption of innocence into the law and provided for legal representation in major cases. However, many of its suggestions have languished in legislative limbo or were never initiated in the first place. It is time they were reconsidered.
The Judicial Reform Foundation has worked since 1997 to improve the nation’s judiciary and its legal education system. It has pushed for laws to better monitor judges and remove bad ones, a necessary measure because judges have tenure after serving a two-year internship. Once again, it is time the foundation’s recommendations were put into effect.
As Ma said, we cannot rely upon an anti-corruption commission to fix all the problems, because tackling corruption requires the resolve of government leaders. The nation is waiting to see just how much resolve Ma and the KMT have.
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