North Korea continues to defy the world on almost everything. The latest was the sinking of a South Korean navy ship with a North Korean torpedo, killing 46 crew members. Pyongyang denies the accusation, even though its involvement was investigated and confirmed by an international inquiry.
Even if one were to give some credence to Pyongyang’s denial, its history suggests that the sinking of the South Korean ship is in line with the regime’s propensity to spread murder and mayhem.
However, all the brouhaha created by this serious act of criminality seems to have died down. After making a big show of protests and follow-up action (with the support of the US), Seoul has also gone relatively quiet.
There are two reasons for this. First, China has put a damper on punitive action against Pyongyang. Both the US and South Korea were hopeful that, faced with the evidence of North Korean involvement, Beijing might line up with the rest of the world to take action against North Korea.
Therefore, they put much store in Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s (溫家寶) recent visit to Seoul to examine the issue. After a flurry of meetings in South Korea, however, Wen wasn’t keen on blaming the North. He instead espoused a policy of restraint to calm the situation.
In other words, China seemed to put both sides of the Korean Peninsula on an equal footing in relation to the crisis. Apparently, China’s reluctance to buy into the inter-Korean crisis had a dampening effect on both South Korea and its ally, the US.
Wen’s South Korea trip has emphasized China’s special security interests in the Korean Peninsula. It had apparently heard Pyongyang’s version of events from the “Dear Leader” when North Korean leader Kim Jong-il visited China last month in a special train and was warmly welcomed by China’s top leadership. Therefore, it shouldn’t be surprising that Wen refused to take sides.
The US might take comfort in the critical observations of some Chinese academics bemoaning that North Korea has hijacked China’s foreign policy in the Korean Peninsula. But, they argue, this cannot be sustained and, sooner or later, China will have had enough of it. It might be part of the good cop-bad cop routine, because nothing about China is that simple.
Another reason for the calming of the rhetoric in the Korean situation is that South Korea’s ruling party has suffered a drubbing in the country’s local and regional elections.
Seoul made a lot of noise (even canceling the few economic ties it had with the North) over the issue of its ship’s sinking. It believed that a South Korean government standing up to North Korea’s bullying would be a popular move.
After all, the present conservative government came to power promising a hard line, but it would appear that its strong rhetoric hasn’t gone over well with many of its people and it has lowered the decibel level.
And where China is concerned, North Korea seems to get away with even the murder of Chinese citizens across their border in Liaoning Province.
According to a spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “On the morning of June 4, some residents of Dandong, in Liaoning Province, were shot by a North Korean border guard on suspicion of crossing the border for trade activities, leaving three dead and one injured.”
China’s response was quite passive, simply raising “a solemn representation with the DPRK [North Korea]” and awaiting investigation.
It will obviously be sorted out in a low-key fashion.
Whichever way one looks, China’s role in the Korean Peninsula is considered critical, but Beijing is not inclined to pressure North Korea. And without that, there can be no forward movement, be it on the sinking of the South Korean ship or, more importantly, on Pyongyang’s nuclear program.
At one point, when North Korea was saber-rattling with its atomic tests, Beijing seemed quite worried and took a common stand in the UN Security Council to slap sanctions on North Korea. But it was weak on implementing the sanctions, thus continuing to provide a lifeline for the North’s regime.
China has apparently come to the conclusion that if it denied North Korea its essential supplies, the regime would collapse and with it, the country itself. That would flood China with a horde of refugees, creating all sorts of unpredictable problems.
Since then, the internal situation in North Korea has only gotten worse. Kim’s health seems to have further deteriorated, which the Chinese must have noted during his recent trip to Beijing.
The succession issue, with his youngest son supposedly favored to take over, doesn’t appear to have been sorted out. The country is in a prolonged state of food scarcity, with widespread hunger. Even morale is very low, there are no signs of rebellion of any sort.
With the government exercising total control, it is not surprising that people are afraid to challenge the regime. However, all the signs of a collapse from within are there.
China’s economic and political support, however, is delaying the inevitable. China is, of course, worried about the influx of refugees if North Korea were to collapse. But that is going to happen any way, sooner or later.
If this is so, it would be in China’s interest to work out with the US and other countries a comprehensive refugee policy to share the burden.
However, China is obviously not keen on a regional or global approach as it regards the Korean Peninsula as its own strategic patch. It doesn’t want to involve other countries and further muddy the situation when the US already has troops stationed in South Korea.
Despite this, the US depends more and more on China, believing that the US and China have shared non-proliferation objectives. That may well be true in a limited sense, but China sees it in a larger context.
The US doesn’t share a border with North Korea. A murky and dangerous situation arising from an unstable North might trigger a US military response on behalf of its South Korean ally against a perceived or actual attack from Pyongyang.
Therefore, for the US to imagine a shared or common strategic objective with China in regard to North Korea is shortsighted. For China, geopolitically, the Korean Peninsula is its backyard.
For the US, on the other hand, North Korea (like Iran), is a test of its policy to deter nuclear proliferation and its obligation to support South Korea against an attack from the North.
While China must be involved to stop North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, the US cannot depend largely on China to promote its strategic goals.
Sushil Seth is a writer based in Australia.
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