It has taken almost two years since the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and more than three years since the beginning of the global recession brought on by the financial sector’s misdeeds, for the US and Europe to finally reform financial regulation.
Perhaps we should celebrate the regulatory victories in both Europe and the US. After all, there is almost universal agreement that the crisis the world is facing today — and is likely to continue to face for years — is a result of the excesses of the deregulation movement begun under former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher and former US president Ronald Reagan 30 years ago. Unfettered markets are neither efficient nor stable.
However, the battle and even the victory has left a bitter taste. Most of those responsible for the mistakes — whether at the US Federal Reserve, the US Treasury, the Bank of England and Financial Services Authority, the European Commission and European Central Bank or in individual banks — have not owned up to their failures.
Banks that wreaked havoc on the global economy have resisted doing what needs to be done. Worse still, they have received support from the Fed, which one might have expected to adopt a more cautious stance, given the scale of its past mistakes and the extent to which it is evident that it reflects the interests of the banks that it was supposed to regulate.
This is important not just as a matter of history and accountability because much is being left up to regulators. And that leaves open the question: Can we trust them? To me, the answer is an unambiguous “no,” which is why we need to “hard-wire” more of the regulatory framework. The usual approach of delegating responsibility to regulators to work out the details will not suffice.
And that raises another question: Whom can we trust? On complex economic matters, trust had been vested in bankers (after all, if they make so much money, they obviously know something) and in regulators, who often (but not always) came from the markets.
However, the events of recent years have shown that bankers can make megabucks, even as they undermine the economy and impose massive losses on their own firms.
Bankers have also shown themselves to be “ethically challenged.” A court of law will decide whether Goldman Sachs’ behavior — betting against products that it created — was illegal. The court of public opinion has already rendered its verdict on the far more relevant question of the ethics of that behavior. That Goldman’s chief executive saw himself as doing “God’s work” as his firm sold short products that it created, or disseminated scurrilous rumors about a country where it was serving as an “adviser,” suggests a parallel universe, with different mores and values.
As always, the “devil is in the details,” and financial-sector lobbyists have labored hard to make sure that the new regulations’ details work to their employers’ benefit. As a result, it will likely be a long time before we can assess the success of whatever law the US Congress ultimately enacts.
However, the criteria for judgment are clear: The new law must curb the practices that jeopardized the entire global economy, and reorient the financial system toward its proper tasks — managing risk, allocating capital, providing credit (especially to small and medium-sized enterprises) and operating an efficient payments system.
We should toast the likely successes. Some form of financial-product safety commission will be established; more derivative trading will move to exchanges and clearing houses from the shadows of the murky “bespoke” market; and some of the worst mortgage practices will be restricted. Moreover, it looks likely that the outrageous fees charged for every debit transaction — a kind of tax that goes not for any public purpose but to fill the banks’ coffers — will be curtailed.
However, the likely failures are equally noteworthy. The problem of “too-big-to-fail” banks is now worse than it was before the crisis. Increased resolution authority will help, but only a little. In the last crisis, the US government “blinked,” failed to use the powers that it had, and needlessly bailed out shareholders and bondholders — all because it feared that doing otherwise would lead to economic trauma. As long as there are banks that are too big to fail, government will most likely “blink” again.
It is no surprise that the big banks succeeded in stopping some essential reforms; what was a surprise was a provision in the US Senate’s bill that banned government-insured entities from underwriting risky derivatives. Such government-insured underwriting distorts the market, giving big banks a competitive advantage, not necessarily because they are more efficient, but because they are “too big to fail.”
The Fed’s defense of the big banks — that it is important for borrowers to be able to hedge their risks — reveals the extent to which it has been captured. The legislation was not intended to ban derivatives, but only to bar implicit government guarantees, subsidized by taxpayers (remember the US$180 billion AIG bailout?), which are not a natural or inevitable byproduct of lending.
There are many ways of curbing big banks’ excesses. A strong version of the so-called Volcker Rule (designed to force government-insured banks to return to their core mission of lending) might work. However, the US government would be remiss to leave things as they are.
The Senate bill’s provision on derivatives is a good litmus test. The administration of US President Barack Obama and the Fed, in opposing these restrictions, have clearly lined up on the side of big banks. If effective restrictions on the derivatives business of government-insured banks (whether actually insured, or effectively insured because they are too big to fail) survive in the final version of the bill, the general interest might indeed prevail over special interests, and democratic forces over moneyed lobbyists.
However, if, as most pundits predict, these restrictions are deleted, it will be a sad day for democracy — and a sadder day for the prospects of meaningful financial reform.
Joseph Stiglitz is University Professor at Columbia University and a Nobel laureate in Economics.
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