The mayoral elections of the five to-be-created special municipalities are crucial to the survival of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Secretary-General King Pu-tsung’s (金溥聰) system. With the Nov. 27 elections six months away, the KMT and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) are entering an “all-out war.”
The difference from the local government elections late last year is that these November polls pose a challenge to the two parties’ internal integration and their ability to mobilize voters.
The China issue is expected to be a focus in the battle, turning the elections into a vote of confidence in Ma.
From the nomination of candidates to voting day, both the KMT and the DPP must face problems of internal cohesion, setting a campaign agenda and mobilizing supporters to build momentum.
That the KMT has already announced its nominees does not imply internal unity. Rather, it highlights the authoritarian nature of the Ma-King system. Since Ma alone — as KMT chairman — is in charge of approving nominees, he is sowing the seeds of future conflict in the party.
As the KMT moves quickly to announce its nominees, on the surface it appears ready for the elections. However, it is internally weak because those who were not nominated may be reluctant to support their rivals.
If the party’s election results are unsatisfactory, Ma will be forced to resign as chairman to take responsibility, which would make it unlikely he would gain the KMT’s endorsement to run for re-election in the 2012 presidential poll.
As for the DPP, the nomination process for Kaohsiung and Tainan was tough. But since all the hopefuls had agreed in advance to base the nominations on opinion polls, anyone leaving the party or any split candidacy would lack legitimacy because party supporters will not approve of such actions.
Therefore, the DPP will likely enjoy greater internal unity than the KMT. In addition, after the DPP decides on its three other candidates through negotiations, internal unity will be the only viable option, since there is no turning back. Thus, in the later stages of the campaign, the party will be able to demonstrate unity to boost momentum in its battle with the KMT.
The November elections will differ from previous local elections because the campaigns are likely to be dominated by the China issue.
The government is likely to promote its pro-Beijing policy, focusing on an economic cooperation framework agreement and a cross-strait peace agreement, while linking the five municipalities to China, and then wrapping it all up in a glossy globalization wrapper. The DPP will be unable to continue to avoid the China issue. The content of its planned 10-year political platform will be the criterion on which voters assess its ability to rule again.
The year-end elections will not be easy for either party. They will be the biggest vote of confidence since Ma came to power.
It will also be a key battle that may reverse the government’s pro-China leanings. The voters’ choice will decide what Taiwan’s next step will be.
Lee Cheng-hung holds a doctoral degree from the Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies at National Sun Yat-sen University.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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