Vaccination is the best way to protect against influenza. The government, with vaccines sourced from home and abroad, launched an inoculation program on Nov. 1 for those considered at high risk of contracting A(H1N1), or swine flu. It subsequently launched a nationwide immunization program on Dec. 12, hoping to shield the population against the global epidemic.
Despite the government’s all-out campaign, and despite incentives such as cabbage, towels and stationery offered at some locations, the inoculation rate remains short of the targeted 30 percent of the population. Department of Health Minister Yaung Chih-liang (楊志良) said the inoculation rate was around 20 percent as of Tuesday.
Clearly, reports of side effects have dissuaded some people from being vaccinated.
While some may attribute their hesitation to the effectiveness of the vaccines produced by Adimmune Corp — the nation’s sole manufacturer of the H1N1 vaccine for humans — the truth of the matter is the government’s perfunctory handling of complaints and reported side effects has fueled public distrust about the locally produced vaccine and decreased confidence in the vaccination program.
After the inoculation program was launched last month, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) said it received a few requests for compensation from people who suffered problems after receiving an H1N1 shot. The complaints ranged from mild dizziness and nausea among students to a high school student who became numb on the left side of her body to two stillbirths and deaths among elderly recipients.
The latest alleged vaccine-related problem is the death of a seven-year-old boy on Monday, 32 days after receiving an H1N1 vaccination. The child’s father, a physician, said his son developed a high fever and a skin rash on Dec. 2.
Each time, the CDC’s answer to these reports has been a quick dismissal that any problems or reported side effects had “nothing to do with the new vaccines,” and that frequency of side effects was similar to other nations.
True, mild dizziness and nausea might be common and thus deemed normal for people who are fearful of vaccinations. There is no evidence in some of the cases that would link the symptoms to the vaccines. There is also no question that, given this nation’s level of medical technology and professionalism, Adimmune could not produce vaccines that are safe and effective. The key, though, is whether the company was given ample time to develop, produce and test this vaccine.
When deaths accompany reported side effects, the Department of Health needs to be prudent and take steps to determine the exact cause of the deaths rather than quickly try to delink the complaints from the vaccine. The CDC’s speedy dismissal of each complaint, without offering an in-depth follow-up or careful review, risks suggesting that the CDC is more concerned with defending Adimmune than guarding public health.
The key to allaying concerns about the vaccine is the government’s attitude. Does it have the sense of responsibility to conduct thorough investigations, or does it remain so self-confident that it is willing to ignore political packaging — as it did in August with Typhoon Morakot?
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