Anybody who believed the findings of the Control Yuan’s investigation into who was responsible for the infamous decision initially to refuse foreign material aid in the aftermath of Typhoon Morakot will probably also be waiting up on Thursday night hoping to glimpse Santa Claus and his reindeer.
Wednesday’s report — which reads like a student’s excuse for not doing homework — censured the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) for issuing the refusal while putting the blame for the decision to refuse offers of foreign disaster rescue expertise at the feet of Director-General of the National Fire Administration Huang Chi-min (黃季敏), deputy commander of the Central Emergency Operation Center when the typhoon struck.
While Huang may indeed — as has been reported — have suggested that no foreign rescue aid was required, it is stretching the boundaries of belief to suggest that the MOFA then issued a memo to the nation’s embassies and representative offices without getting the go-ahead from a more senior government official.
While former deputy foreign minister Andrew Hsia (夏立言) became the sacrificial lamb over the memo, the real decision maker has managed to remain hidden. This is scandalous as the delay in the arrival of foreign rescue aid without doubt contributed to deaths that could have otherwise been avoided.
The Control Yuan’s investigation and subsequent corrective measures can be seen as the government’s attempt to close the file on the Morakot disaster. They suggest that no government official will actually be held accountable for what was a gross dereliction of duty by government officials on so many different levels.
The government watchdog has once again failed to perform to its remit.
If the Control Yuan was serious about its work and if its members actually felt any remorse for the hundreds of deaths caused by Morakot it should be finding out why — if its conclusions are to believed — such low-level staffers were allowed to make such a crucial decision, impeaching those responsible and making sure that it never happens again. While doing so, it could also investigate why, if Hsia was so negligent in his duties, he was then given a cushy job as the nation’s representative to Indonesia and whether this was a pay off for him taking the fall over the memo.
But one shouldn’t expect too much from the Control Yuan. After all, this was the same body that initially refused to impeach repugnant former Government Information Office official Kuo Kuan-ying (郭冠英), only doing so after a public outcry. This is also the same Control Yuan that found a lowly engineer responsible for the Maokong Gondola fiasco.
While the idea of the Control Yuan has noble ambitions, Taiwan’s fiercely polarized political climate means that those ideals have been corrupted. This is why the Control Yuan sat idle for more than three years after former president Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) nominees were stonewalled by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT)-dominated legislature and why three DPP-affiliated members nominated by Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) were rejected last year.
This is also why the current body and its majority of pan-blue sympathizers cannot effectively deal with accusations of government impropriety, no matter how serious they may be.
Until this problem is remedied, we can look forward to more of the same from the government’s toothless watchdog.
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