Rushing to respond to President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) recent interview with the Wall Street Journal in which he was quoted as supporting a timetable of 10 years for Taiwan and China to consider unification, the Presidential Office on Tuesday said that the president had been misquoted.
Ma’s actual and complete wording was: “Whether there will be reunification as expected by the mainland side depends very much on what is going to unfold in the next decades.
“This is a question no one can answer at this stage. But as the president of this country, I believe that the 23 million people of Taiwan want to secure one or two generations of peace and prosperity so that people on either side of the Taiwan Strait can have sufficient time and freedom to understand, to appreciate and to decide what to do,” the Presidential Office’s version read, stressing that Ma’s words in the Nov. 25 interview were “next decades,” not “next decade.”
The Presidential Office may think it has put out the fire with this explanation, but it has missed the point.
Whether the wording was “next decade” or “next decades” is beside the case.
The crux of the controversy is: What gives Ma the authority to set a timetable of any duration for Taiwanese to consider unification with China?
The decision on Taiwan’s future — be it independence, unification or the “status quo” — lies in the hands of Taiwanese. It is not a subject that the Taiwanese people have authorized the president to decide unilaterally, nor a subject that should be influenced by what people on the other side of the Strait believe.
During campaigning and when delivering major speeches, Ma often states that “Taiwan’s future should be decided by its 23 million people.”
This wording sounds democratic and shows respect for the idea that Taiwanese should determine the country’s fate.
Ma’s remarks in the Wall Street Journal interview, however, confirm that he wants eventual unification with China.
Ironically, amid the brouhaha over Ma’s remarks on a “unification” timetable, a new survey has provided more troubling food for thought for the president.
In the latest CommonWealth magazine poll on Tuesday, 62 percent of those surveyed said they consider themselves Taiwanese, 22 percent said they see themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese, while a mere 8 percent said they regard themselves as Chinese.
Of particular interest is the finding that among respondents aged 18 to 29, 75 percent described themselves as Taiwanese.
As the saying goes: “There go the people, I must follow them, for I am their leader.”
Ma, as the nation’s highest elected official, should heed mainstream opinion rather than act unilaterally and obstinately.
Only this way will he have the chance to serve another term as president.
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