This government’s ability to capitulate at the drop of a hat when dealing with China never ceases to amaze.
The latest example came on Friday last week when Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) Chairman Sean Chen (陳冲) told legislators that he would not sign the cross-strait financial memorandum of understanding (MOU) if China failed to respect Taiwan’s request that his full official title appear on the document. He added that he would rather not sign at all if doing so would put “national sovereignty on the line.”
Yet, just three days later, Chen went ahead and signed despite the absence of his title — the MOU reduced to a deal between two financial regulators rather than two governments.
The last 18 months has shown President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and his administration’s definition of “defending sovereignty” appears to be vastly different from that of most ordinary Taiwanese, or anyone else for that matter.
From the signing of the numerous cross-strait agreements to the treatment of flag-waving Republic of China protesters during Chinese negotiator Chen Yunlin’s (陳雲林) visit last year, time and again the Ma administration has rolled over like a puppy having its belly scratched when faced with Chinese demands.
Dissenting voices are always met with the mantra that we should “put aside our differences” on economic matters that will benefit the country as well as references to the numerous “achievements” the Ma administration has made.
The problem is that — apart from a few industrialists and tour operators — who can honestly say they have profited from Ma’s policy of cross-strait capitulation?
Another problem is that it is very obvious that China does not view these deals in the same manner, with Beijing’s officials under no illusions as to where things are heading. Who can forget, for instance, Chinese Consul-General to Fukuoka Wu Shumin (武樹民) saying to Democratic Progressive Party Legislator Hsiao Bi-khim (蕭美琴) in Japan in May: “What international space? Ma Ying-jeou accepts the ‘one China’ principle, so we give him international space.”
Even US academics appear to be more aware than Ma, with US economist Daniel Rosen telling a conference in Washington on Tuesday that China is not interested in the economic gains from an ECFA; instead, Chinese officials view it merely as “lay[ing] the groundwork for a ‘happy ending.’”
This conclusion was backed by US-Taiwan Business Council president Rupert Hammond Chambers, who said China’s overarching goal was unification and that all its policies, including an ECFA, were channeled in that direction.
In the end it comes down to the question of who is fooling who?
Is China fooling the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) or does the KMT believe it is fooling China? The latter is harder to believe, given the KMT’s poor record in dealing with the Chinese Communist Party.
The other option could be that Ma and his administration are fully aware of what is going on and are engaged in an intricate game to see how far they can push Taiwan toward unification without provoking the electorate — the vast majority of whom are against such an outcome.
This would certainly be in line with Ma’s oft-stated preference for eventual unification and his position as chairman of a party that is colluding with Beijing to stifle any other option.
This would also explain the capitulations.
What began on Feb. 28 as a military campaign against Iran quickly became the largest energy-supply disruption in modern times. Unlike the oil crises of the 1970s, which stemmed from producer-led embargoes, US President Donald Trump is the first leader in modern history to trigger a cascading global energy crisis through direct military action. In the process, Trump has also laid bare Taiwan’s strategic and economic fragilities, offering Beijing a real-time tutorial in how to exploit them. Repairing the damage to Persian Gulf oil and gas infrastructure could take years, suggesting that elevated energy prices are likely to persist. But the most
In late January, Taiwan’s first indigenous submarine, the Hai Kun (海鯤, or Narwhal), completed its first submerged dive, reaching a depth of roughly 50m during trials in the waters off Kaohsiung. By March, it had managed a fifth dive, still well short of the deep-water and endurance tests required before the navy could accept the vessel. The original delivery deadline of November last year passed months ago. CSBC Corp, Taiwan, the lead contractor, now targets June and the Ministry of National Defense is levying daily penalties for every day the submarine remains unfinished. The Hai Kun was supposed to be
Most schoolchildren learn that the circumference of the Earth is about 40,000km. They do not learn that the global economy depends on just 160 of those kilometers. Blocking two narrow waterways — the Strait of Hormuz and the Taiwan Strait — could send the economy back in time, if not to the Stone Age that US President Donald Trump has been threatening to bomb Iran back to, then at least to the mid-20th century, before the Rolling Stones first hit the airwaves. Over the past month and a half, Iran has turned the Strait of Hormuz, which is about 39km wide at
The ongoing Middle East crisis has reinforced an uncomfortable truth for Taiwan: In an increasingly interconnected and volatile world, distant wars rarely remain distant. What began as a regional confrontation between the US, Israel and Iran has evolved into a strategic shock wave reverberating far beyond the Persian Gulf. For Taiwan, the consequences are immediate, material and deeply unsettling. From Taipei’s perspective, the conflict has exposed two vulnerabilities — Taiwan’s dependence on imported energy and the risks created when Washington’s military attention is diverted. Together, they offer a preview of the pressures Taiwan might increasingly face in an era of overlapping geopolitical
RSS