A joint session of the US Congress recently passed the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act. In an unusual move, Section 1226 was removed, despite the fact that it had cleared the Senate and the House of Representatives three months ago. Since this section was related to the strengthening of Taiwan’s air force, its abrupt removal has overshadowed Taiwan-US relations and may have a profound influence on East Asian security.
Section 3 of the Taiwan Relations Act states that either the US president or Congress can initiate a proposal of US arms sales to Taiwan. It is less common that Congress would do so, and it has only happened once in this century with the 2002 National Defense Authorization Act, which clearly stated that the US was to sell four Kidd-class destroyers to Taiwan.
This year, Congress has once again proposed selling weapons to Taiwan after the Department of Defense’s 2009 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China called for a response to the cross-strait military imbalance and the new challenges to Taiwan’s security posed by the development and deployment of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Although the proposed bill did not clearly specify the types and quantity of defense weapons to be sold to Taiwan, it required the US president to submit a report on the state of Taiwan’s air force to Congress within 90 days of enactment.
The report had to detail the types, quantity, age and combat capabilities of Taiwan’s military aircraft and include an assessment of weapon systems and platforms Taiwan needs to maintain control of its own air space “in the face of a full-scale concerted missile and air campaign by China.”
Options for the US to assist Taiwan in achieving those capabilities and a five-year plan to provide Taiwan with self-defense assistance were also to be included in the report.
However, before passing the bill, the congressional conference removed Section 1226 from the final version, which will come into effect upon approval by the president. The move was probably the result of the White House acting out of strategic and diplomatic concerns.
US President Barack Obama reiterated at the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in late July that he had high hopes for cooperation between Washington and Beijing in the areas of finance, trade, environmental protection, health, military, anti-terrorism and anti-nuclear proliferation.
As a result of his first presidential visit to China during his trip to Asia next month, Obama deliberately put off the sale of three proposed arms items to Taiwan — submarine designs, universal helicopters and two sets of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missiles — refused to meet the Dalai Lama and blocked Congress from initiating an arms sales to Taiwan proposal. All this ran in the same groove as it was an attempt to build an atmosphere conducive to cooperation between the US and China.
Although these actions did not exclude the possibility that Obama will initiate a proposal for arms sales to Taiwan next year, his move to discourage pro-Taiwan elements in Congress from doing so has put him in a position where he cannot shirk responsibility for China. In addition, his visit to China is significant and has become an important variable in US arms sales to Taiwan.
If his talks with Beijing run smoothly, Obama may not be willing to ruin the prospects of further bilateral cooperation because of arms sales to Taiwan. Although Minister of Foreign Affairs Timothy Yang (楊進添) said during his report to the legislature earlier this month that the frozen US arms sales proposals to Taiwan would soon be unfrozen, that has now become more uncertain.
For years, Taiwan’s security has been maintained by the natural barrier provided by the Taiwan Strait, advanced military technology and the US policy of strategic ambiguity.
When former US president George W. Bush took office in 2001, he was inclined to replace “strategic ambiguity” (possible interference) with “strategic clarity” (explicit interference). Although the collision between a US Navy surveillance plan and a Chinese fighter jet over the South China Sea in 2001 and anti-terrorism needs forced Bush back to square one on the Taiwan issue, the US continued to sell weapons to Taipei during his term of office.
Since Obama assumed office almost a year ago, it has become commonplace to procrastinate on proposals for arms sales to Taiwan and there has been no progress in US-Taiwan relations. This shows that the US seems to be reconsidering and redefining its interests in East Asia.
Obama’s move to block congressional support for Taiwan was not only based on personal concerns — to avoid limiting his negotiation leverage — but also a result of China’s rise and the fact that Chinese cooperation is needed in resolving international issues.
President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) diplomatic policies toward China and the US are also a key factor. It has been important for the Ma administration to gain advantages from both sides and not to get stuck in between. The fact that Obama has not declared his stance toward US arms sales to Taiwan and that he prevented Congress from showing support for Taiwan suggest that he still has doubts on the gravity of cross-strait matters and relations.
If the Ma administration does not take this situation seriously, US concerns will continue to intensify.
Emerson Chang is director of the Department of International Studies at Nan Hua University.
TRANSLATED BY TED YANG
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