The relationship between Hong Kong’s stalled demand for full universal suffrage and Beijing’s plans for unification with Taiwan came to the fore late last month when Hong Kong played host to a high-profile Chinese Communist Party (CCP) representative. Du Qinglin (杜青林) heads the party’s United Front Work Department and came from Beijing to aid what he called the “difficult and complex” task of national reunification.
Du’s assignment was to officiate at inaugural ceremonies for the Hong Kong branch of China’s Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification. The organization, established in 1988, now has chapters in more than 80 countries and works primarily among Chinese communities to promote relations across the Taiwan Strait. A branch was set up in Macau five years ago.
The implications of Du’s visit became apparent even before he arrived and were reinforced by his remarks at the ceremonial gathering of 1,400 people in Hong Kong on July 30. It was announced beforehand that Du would not meet any members of Hong Kong’s pan-democratic political camp, nor were they included on the guest lists for any of the events held during his three-day stay. Yet he said in his keynote speech that the new Hong Kong branch was an “all-Hong Kong” organization and he called on Hong Kongers to publicize the success of their “one country, two systems” formula as a model for Taiwan-China unification.
Based on the Wen Wei Po daily’s report of the speech, it sounded like something written for another era that had lain forgotten in United Front Work Department files for a dozen years until someone mistakenly approved it for use without regard to present political realities either in Hong Kong or Taiwan.
Another speech at the July 30 ceremony, however, was very much up-to-date. Peng Qinghua (彭清華) heads the central government’s official liaison office in Hong Kong. This office, set up in 2000, was not mentioned in any of the pre-1997 documents but has become Beijing’s increasingly outspoken local authority.
According to the Wen Wei Po, Peng “emphasized that national unification is the common aim of the leaders of both the Chinese Nationalist Party [KMT] and the CCP.”
The questions raised by Du’s visit are twofold. First, how can the new organization be considered “all-Hong Kong in nature” when local democrats are not represented, even though they are still winning 60 percent of the vote in Hong Kong’s direct elections for half the seats in its 60-member Legislative Council? Second, on what political grounds does Beijing intend unification to take place — given Hong Kong’s experience — since Taiwan and China are governed by two very different political systems?
Hong Kong’s one-country, two-systems formula has appeared successful until now because it is in the early stage of implementation. The formula has only a 50-year lifespan (1997-2047), however, and should not be seen as a permanent solution. It is being used instead as a means of easing the transition to a one-country, one-system formula, meaning full integration within Beijing’s political system. This transition is now well-advanced in Hong Kong and the most contentious issues are those in which Hong Kong, as represented by its pan-democratic leaders, is resisting the pressures to impose mainland Chinese-style political norms and institutions.
The most important of these pressures to date are: Beijing’s insistence on introducing mainland-style national political security laws; Beijing’s refusal to allow a wholly elected local government, allegedly because too many voters still prefer democratic candidates; and the increasingly critical commentary in mainland sources about Hong Kong’s independent Western-influenced judiciary, which now stands as the court of last resort guaranteeing Hong Kong’s much-valued freedom of political expression. Not only did Du refuse to meet local democrats, he also declined to comment on any of these outstanding issues.
Journalist Frank Ching (秦家聰) noted the contradiction in the South China Morning Post. Ching’s pro-unification stance has won him little applause from Taiwanese independence supporters. Until recently, he accepted the “one country, two systems” formula at face value, assuming that its promised “high degree of autonomy” would be genuine.
Now, however, he sees the promise eroding: “Taiwan will see Hong Kong as more of a negative example than anything else” if Beijing does not allow universal suffrage to be “properly implemented.”
Ching nevertheless failed to spell out the full extent of Beijing’s dilemma. He noted correctly that most Hong Kongers, including democrats, do not support Taiwanese independence. On this point, Du was correct in saying the aim of reunification was “all Hong Kong in nature.” But that begs the question as to why he avoided contact with local democrats.
Since the mid-1980s, Taiwan’s government has evolved into a wholly and directly elected democracy, which is the aim of Hong Kong democrats as well. Yet Beijing still insists, as it has since the mid-1980s, that the demands by Hong Kongers for a Western-style directly elected representative government is tantamount to demands for independence. This is why mainland sources routinely refer to Hong Kong democrats as anti-party dissidents and why Chinese polemics excoriate them as traitors or worse. Loyalist supporters are guided by this logic, which seems calculated to provoke behavior that they claim is the inevitable consequence of Western-style adversarial politics.
The latest and most extreme example of such behavior is the plot to assassinate Hong Kong democratic leader Martin Lee (李柱銘) and Jimmy Lai (黎智英), publisher of both the Hong Kong and Taiwan editions of the Apple Daily. Chinese court documents from the Shenzhen trial of some of the suspected conspirators said the plans were funded by a Hong Kong businessman living in Taiwan and orchestrated by others who allegedly justified the plot on patriotic grounds. Lee and Lai were to be punished for their “anti-China and anti-Chinese Communist Party” political stance.
Beijing needs to explain exactly how Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” formula can be made politically viable for Taiwan when the formula has already produced a political impasse in Hong Kong. No such explanation has been forthcoming, nor has Beijing shown any inclination to ease its demand for unqualified acceptance of one-party, mainland-style rule in Hong Kong. On the contrary, an article in last month’s issue of the online Hong Kong journal by Beijing writer Cheng Jie (程潔) reaffirmed Beijing’s thinking in this regard.
Cheng’s article was written to explain what she calls Beijing’s “new policy” of active involvement in Hong Kong’s political evolution. This shift, she said, followed the massive July 1, 2003, demonstration against proposed national security legislation. Until then, Beijing had viewed Hong Kong as a “politically subdued territory.”
Cheng wrote that since Beijing is not ready to risk a “dissident-run” Hong Kong, the central government itself must control the pace of political reform. Beijing is also troubled by foreign influences and the pre-1997 legal or Basic Law provisions whereby foreign nationals are still being allowed to work as civil servants and judges. Foreigners can also vote in local elections. Beijing regards all this as “sharing governance” with foreigners. Cheng said that the provisions may have been a “great mistake” and that they will certainly complicate Hong Kong’s demands for universal suffrage.
Under the circumstances, Du and his colleagues should prepare some new talking points for use in promoting Taiwan-China unification. “One country, two systems” may have seemed like a good idea back in pre-2003 days when Beijing thought Hong Kong was “politically subdued.” But if Beijing still fears a dissident takeover of Hong Kong, how will party leaders secure safe governing arrangements for Taiwan within the two-systems model? Eliminating Hong Kong’s dissident risk factor seemingly pales in comparison to the task of subduing Taiwan — unless, of course, CCP and KMT leaders think they have already hit upon a political solution. The ultimate questions then are whether Beijing is misreading Taiwan as it did Hong Kong, and what else the CCP and KMT might have agreed on besides the ultimate aim of national unification.
Suzanne Pepper is a Hong Kong-based US writer.
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