The survey found that 55.3 percent of respondents considered Ma’s cross-strait policy to be more beneficial for Taiwan than that of former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), while 53.4 percent of respondents said Ma’s cross-strait policy had been successful thus far.
But how we can better explain and formulate a security policy toward China using a constructivist approach?
The answer lies in the social interactions and cultural norms that shape common identities, while the interests of the state can facilitate intersubjective (or shared) understandings conducive to the improving of cross-strait relations.
For instance, Beijing and Taipei are now on a conciliatory path because of shared understandings — such as the “one China, different interpretations” policy, the premise that cross-strait peace requires China to desist with its military threats and Taiwan not pushing toward independence.
These premises, reinforced by direct flights, tourism, cultural exchanges and increasing economic interdependence, further weave the fabric of cooperation and help transform national attitudes, preferences and the definition of interests so that mutual trust and accommodation become more likely to seep into the security realm.
That is, both sides seem to be experiencing change through rapprochement at this very moment, and each is now less likely to consider itself the antithesis of the other or perceive the other to be a threat to its identity — the source of the security dilemma in the Taiwan Strait.
Of course, this logic of social interaction does not imply that the currently peaceful cross-strait relationship will proceed without conflict.
There must also be some agreement on the status quo between Taiwan and China, a sense of collective identity, a desire to avoid war and an expectation that both sides will act with restraint when conflicts arise.
Beijing should understand that its attempt to bring Taiwan into the “one China” framework through greater economic integration will be effective only if its military threat dissipates.
But if China sought to dominate Taiwan, even without precipitating military conflict, it would complicate relations with almost everyone else in the immediate region, not to mention the US and Australia.
Taipei should also consider that “a broad-based dialogue as close as possible to a consensus is essential before Taiwan’s cross-strait negotiations can advance to more difficult issues,” as American Institute in Taiwan Director Stephen Young said during an American Chamber of Commerce luncheon on June 5.
“Even as we welcome Taiwan’s increased engagement with the People’s Republic of China, however, we must not lose sight of the qualities that underpin Taiwan’s unique success: the vibrant democracy, civil society and open economy,” he said.
Yu Tsung-chi is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States.
RSS