When Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd took office in December, there was widespread speculation that his foreign and defense policies would favor loosening ties with the US and tilting toward China.
Commentators pointed to his major in Chinese history and language, further study of Chinese in Taiwan and service as a diplomat in Beijing. Chinese press and TV news were close to ecstatic that he had come to power.
However, Australian Defense Minister Joel Fitzgibbon asserted that such speculation showed “poor judgment.” He said his prime minister was “well-versed in Chinese politics” and saw his experience in China as an opportunity “to promote trust.” He insisted, however, “that should not be read as a pro-China tilt.”
Fitzgibbon met the leader of the US Pacific Command, Admiral Timothy Keating, and visited Australian ships at Pearl Harbor for the biennial maritime Rim of the Pacific or RimPac exercise. He is scheduled to arrive in Washington today to meet with US Vice President Dick Cheney, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.
Fitzgibbon said his ministry was drafting a new white paper on defense that would stress Australia’s commitment to its US alliance. Australia’s reliance on the US for security “certainly hasn’t changed” with the new government, he said.
He applauded a budding concept at the Pacific Command, which holds that the US need not take the lead in every contingency in Asia and the Pacific. Rather, others should be encouraged to lead while the US takes a supporting role. US officers call it “leading from the middle,” “leading from within,” or “leading from behind.”
Despite its relatively small population of 22 million, Australia has been integrated into the US security posture in Asia because of its strategic location. A senior US officer said: “If they are there, we don’t have to be there.”
Fitzgibbon said Australia hoped to improve the multilateral security architecture in Southeast Asia and that the Rudd government wanted to see all nations within the region or with interests there included. Some past proposals, notably those from former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad, have sought to exclude the US.
Fitzgibbon said he hoped to widen the current focus on economic issues to include strategic foreign and security issues.
He said he was encouraged by Japan’s increasing engagement in security issues, and met Japanese Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba at a conference of defense ministers in Singapore in May. Fitzgibbon said, however, he saw no need to formalize the emerging security partnership between Australia, Japan and the US.
Richard Halloran is a writer based in Hawaii.
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