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Diplomatic ceasefire must show progress

The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) have different opinions on the cross-strait “diplomatic ceasefire.” In August 2000, then-president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), said diplomacy was a necessary activity, hence not only would there not be a diplomatic ceasefire, but Taiwan would try harder to form diplomatic ties. During the DPP’s time in office, Taiwan lost six allies, but its participation in intergovernmental international organizations soared.

President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) proposed the idea of a diplomatic ceasefire in 2006. He also mentioned cross-strait “reconciliation and ceasefire” in his inaugural address. However, Ma’s definition of a “diplomatic ceasefire” — its content, scope, implementation, pros and cons — all await clarification.

Under a diplomatic ceasefire Taiwan would have to accept the “one China” principle. The KMT has announced its acceptance of “one China with each side having its own interpretation” as the so-called “1992 consensus,” thus basically subscribing to the “one China” principle. However, such an unconditional compromise make the diplomatic ceasefire dependent on Beijing’s goodwill.

Beijing has always said Taiwan can have international, but not diplomatic, space. However, China also has to remember that the KMT will not be in power forever. If a diplomatic ceasefire is firmly established, and the DPP returned to power, Beijing would be trapped by its own promises. Another problem with a diplomatic ceasefire is that China would be between a rock and hard place if a diplomatic ally of Taiwan wished to establish ties with Beijing.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Francisco Ou (歐鴻鍊) has said Taiwan will focus on consolidating relations with diplomatic allies, rather than seeking to grab allies from China. However, if Taiwan does not seek new allies, and fails to keep all that it now has, we will end up with the lowest number of diplomatic allies since 1971. There is also a risk that a ceasefire would lessen our diplomats’ sense of crisis and thus their willingness to respond to new challenges.

With a diplomatic ceasefire, Taiwan’s participation in international intergovernmental organizations should see a quantitative increase. The ways in which it participates in international conferences and the types of conferences it can attend should also increase.

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told the Wall Street Journal that although the US encourages a relaxation of cross-strait relations, it also has a relationship with Taiwan, and would like to see Taiwan have more space in the international community, such as in the WHO.

Yet, Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi (王毅) takes a different tack. In a meeting with a Japanese parliamentary delegation on June 23, he said Beijing does not accept official Taiwanese membership in the WHO, and is only willing to establish a new framework to allow Taiwan to share medical information with the rest of the world. This greatly underestimates Taiwan’s expectations for international space and is definitely not the objective of Taiwan’s diplomatic ceasefire.

If the KMT’s acceptance of the diplomatic ceasefire on the basis of the “one China” principle does not bring Taiwan WHA observer status, then it will have as little to show for its efforts as the DPP. One goal of such a ceasefire would be to gain WHA observer status, which would also be a way to explore possibilities for World Bank and IMF entry. The government can talk about a diplomatic ceasefire, but the more important challenge is to make the EU and other nations turn their support for Taiwan’s meaningful participation into support for full WHA membership, as is given by the US and Japan.



Lin Cheng-yi is a researcher at Academia Sinica’s Institute of European and American Studies.

TRANSLATED BY ANGELA HONG
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