Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung’s (吳伯雄) first stop in China was Nanjing, the old Nationalist capital, where he paid his respects at the mausoleum of KMT founding father Sun Yat-sen (孫逸仙).
Wu’s capitulatory approach to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), pioneered by former KMT chairman Lien Chan (連戰), is well on the way to becoming the modus operandi for cooperation between the parties.
That Wu first went to Sun’s tomb is tantamount to saying that Sun granted permission to the KMT to surrender to its old foe. The difference is that long ago Sun said the KMT should form an alliance with the Soviets, admit communists into the party and help farmers and laborers; now it’s the Communists who are admitting Nationalists.
When Chen Yunlin (陳雲林), director of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, delivered a welcome speech to Wu at Nanjing’s airport, his self-importance and self-satisfaction placed Wu — with his more cautious attitude — at a disadvantage.
In lauding the success of China’s United Front strategy, Chen even exclaimed that he could finally “see the sun come out after the rain.” And Wu, a target of the United Front strategy, endorsed the so-called “1992 consensus,” without daring to mention its actual meaning of “one China, different interpretations.”
When Wu talked about President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), he addressed him as “Mr Ma.” Ma and Wu may have their difficulties, but Wu probably said this to placate the CCP and not irritate the president. Either way, he belittled Taiwan and his own party.
Apparently the more than 7 million Taiwanese who voted for Ma didn’t elect a president of Taiwan or the Republic of China (ROC), but a “mister.”
There is an inscription on Sun’s mausoleum that reads “Integrity of Heaven and Earth.” While he was there, Wu wrote a couplet underneath it that read: “All under Heaven belongs to the people; people are the most important” (天下為公,人民最大). But where was Wu’s integrity in his performance a day earlier? He showed only humility before the CCP’s leaders.
How can he say “People are the most important?” When the president elected by the Taiwanese public suddenly becomes a “Mr” in China, then who is bigger in Wu’s eyes, the Taiwanese polity or the CCP? A couplet that reads “The country belongs to the People’s Republic; people are of the least importance” would have been more in keeping with Wu’s approach.
Of course, there is a reason why Wu trampled upon his country’s president. In 2000, Lien not only refused to attend the ceremony that handed power to the DPP, he also called then president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) “Mr Chen” instead of “Mr President.”
This seemed a matter of vicious competition between the pan-green and pan-blue camps at the time, but now, with Wu also calling his president “mister,” it’s becoming clear that this is a 21st century tradition of KMT chairmen.
They don’t think Taiwan or the ROC really is a country; to them, it is a part of the People’s Republic of China. Why else would they address Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) as “Chairman Hu,” and not call Ma “President Ma?”
When Wu left for China, Ma stated that he wanted Wu to make clear to the Chinese leaders that the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait want peace, prosperity and respect, and that he hoped the two sides could resume negotiations based on the so-called “1992 consensus.” But does undermining President Ma’s authority constitute the kind of respect that Ma and ordinary Taiwanese deserve?
It has been reported that Ma sees this process as a useful “second track” to negotiations between Taiwan and China. While the KMT assists the government, so the reasoning goes, the president directs cross-strait policy.
But as things look now, there is a “mister” in charge of cross-strait policy.
There are already too many other “misters” in the KMT. If “Mr” Wu can remove the presidential laurel from Ma’s head, then is this a sign of the party assisting the government, or the party leading the government?
Put another way, does Taiwan need a second track to woo China?
Ma must clear up whether this pantomime was Wu’s own doing, or whether it is part of a broader strategy emanating from the Presidential Office.
Paul Lin is a political commentator based in Taiwan.
Translated by Anna Stiggelbout
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