The UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf has set a deadline of May 12 next year for claims submissions, and signatory nations to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea have been quickening their pace in enacting related laws.
The Philippines is no exception, and both houses of Congress have proposed bills to incorporate the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoal, the only visible part of the Macclesfield Bank, into Philippine territory, which would result in a redrawing of its continental shelf boundary lines. These actions are worthy of our attention.
On Dec. 13 last year, the Philippine House of Representatives passed House Bill 3216, which redefines the baseline of Philippine territory, on second reading. However, the Commission on Maritime and Ocean Affairs, an office under the Office of the President, expressed reservations about the bill because it incorporated the Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands into the Philippine archipelagic baseline. This could spark regional tensions and harm cooperation with China.
The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs sent the baseline bill back to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs for another review. The department seeks to designate the Spratlys, referred to as the Kalayaan Islands by the Philippines, as a “regime of islands” rather than enclosing them within the national baseline.
In other words, the department’s baseline would be determined separately from the Philippine archipelago.
The Philippines is also planning to expand the limits of its continental shelf from 200 nautical miles (370km) to 350 nautical miles, supposedly to gain access to the Spratlys’ natural resources and oil.
The HB 3216 baseline bill defines at least six territories, including the Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal, which do not belong to the Philippines, as lying within the national baseline. It would be difficult under international law for this claim to be recognized.
Senator Antonio Trillanes advocates connecting the Scarborough Shoal with the Philippine archipelago while designating the Spratlys as a “regime of islands.” This situation would be similar to the UK’s ownership of the Falkland Islands or the US’ ownership of the Hawaiian islands.
This position adopted by the Philippines is unacceptable. The territory of the Philippines is clearly outlined in Article 3 of the 1898 Treaty of Paris between the US and Spain, which specified the boundaries using latitudinal and longitudinal positions.
Afterwards, the Philippines amended the baseline by passing the Baseline Law in 1961 and Republic Act 5446 in 1968. Presidential Decree 1596 issued in 1978 claimed the Kalayaan Islands as part of the Philippines.
These were all unilateral acts of illegal territorial expansion.
According to Article 3 of the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the islands south of the 20th parallel of north latitude to the US. The Batanes Islands, which lie on the 21st parallel, fall outside that range and so do not belong to the Philippines.
The 1961 Baseline Law extended the northern boundary to 21˚ 7’ N. In the same way, Presidential Decree 1596 sought to annex the Spratlys into Philippine territory. Now the Philippines is attempting to take a step further by legislating all of the territory that it claims.
Signatory nations of the Law of the Sea Convention are currently determining their territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, continental shelves and even their continental shelf baselines according to the rules of the convention.
However, international law does not recognize the drawing of archipelagic baselines as a method of claiming sovereignty over a region.
The Philippines wants to annex territory that it does not own by redrawing its archipelagic baseline, but this approach gets it all backwards. This act is a clear violation of the interests of other nations and will lead to international disputes. Since 1955, the Philippines has claimed that it is an archipelago state. This claim was accepted by the convention in 1982, and so it is not in doubt.
However, the convention does not allow a self-proclaimed archipelago state to designate an island group over which it already claims sovereignty as a “regime of islands.”
This also means that the Philippines is prohibited from proclaiming “archipelagic sovereignty” over its main archipelago while claiming an additional “archipelagic sovereignty” over the Spratlys.
The Philippines is a signatory nation to the Law of the Sea Convention, and it happens to be its worst violator. It has unilaterally defined all of the waters that fall within the boundaries of the 1898 treaty as its internal waters and banned foreign ships passing through them.
Taiwanese ships and fishing boats have been serious victims of this policy. Not only are they no longer allowed to pass through those waters, they have also lost access to traditional fish markets in the nearby Batanes and Babuyan Islands.
The Philippine House of Representatives is preparing to complete the drawing of the archipelagic baseline into law before it goes into recess on June 13, but the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee has decided to postpone it.
The Philippines’ unilateral expansion of its territory should be strongly protested. The country should also be urged to rectify its territorial water claims which are in violation of the Law of the Sea Convention.
Chen Hurng-yu is a professor at Tamkang University’s Graduate Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
TRANSLATED BY JAMES CHEN
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