Although China has brought Tibet under control since the recent unrest in Lhasa, the situation has nevertheless led to a flood of criticism from the international community on China’s behavior. Recently, the Washington Times reported that in order to ensure the smooth operations of the Beijing Olympics, the Chinese government would not hesitate to resort to violent measures against so-called “hostile forces.”
This, however, makes one wonder why China would rather risk damaging its international image over these problematic issues than attempt to take advantage of being an Olympic host-country to raise its profile on the world stage.
The key to this dilemma lies in how we consider the role played by China within the international community. Since its reforms and liberalizations of the 1970s, China has gone from being an outsider of the global village to an insider.
Statistics show that by 1996, China had become a member of 51 international organizations and 1,079 non-governmental organizations. However, there have been on-going debates within academia over whether China has been participating in international organizations in recent years only in the pursuit of soft diplomatic power while “selectively” following international norms.
Or is China climbing a steep learning curve? Will China eventually adapt to the expectations of the international community concerning issues such as Falun Gong and Tibet?
Either way, it is often difficult for China to compromise on the following two subjects: national sovereignty and stability. Thus, for China, issues with regards to Falun Gong, independence for Xinjiang, Tibet and even Taiwan are very unique, and always treated differently from other issues. This is why China will not hesitate to resort to force in order to resolve these situations.
Use of force is not an end in itself, but a means to an end. Of course China also cares about its image on the international stage — hence, since the 1989 student movement at Tiananmen Square, China has been extremely careful in its treatment of human rights-issues. However, China has also constantly suspected that behind the myriad of human-rights issues, religious movements and even problems concerning Tibet and Taiwan, there lies a conspiracy contrived by the US, with an aim to balance and oppose its meteoric rise. Therefore, China’s monitoring of hostile forces is mainly directed at the US.
It was not until the Opium Wars that China started to learn how to become a sovereign state, but the concept of sovereignty was not invented by China. Instead, it is a value that had been observed by Western countries before China entered into the international system.
From this perspective, China has, in fact, turned from a challenger to a defender of the international system. Ironically, its suppression of “hostile forces,” is in itself an attempt to safeguard that system.
Wang Hung-Jen is a doctoral student in the Department of Government at Cornell University.
TRANSLATED BY TED YANG
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