Democracy is essentially the pursuit of the secularization of politics. Ironically, this pursuit involves significant sacrifice and, as a result, it takes on a certain degree of sanctity. Once democracy becomes part of daily life, rather than an object of pursuit, that sanctity naturally fades away.
Taiwan joined the third-wave of democratization relatively late last century. With the mindset of someone making a pilgrimage, Taiwan's democracy activists often visited South Korea and the Philippines with the help of the Canadian Urban Rural Mission. Today, Hong Kong democracy activists visit Taiwan during presidential elections with the same mindset.
US political scientist Samuel Huntington has said that only if a third-wave democracy is capable of going through a second peaceful power transition following its initial democratization can that democracy be said to have succeeded. If Taiwan's second power transfer signifies that democracy has been consolidated here, then democracy has become part of our daily life, the sacred pursuit of democracy is about to end and the next election will become a much more mundane affair.
Another reason the nation's democratization process took on a certain sanctity was the independence issue. But after the presidential election last month, this confrontation will also diminish because there is virtually a consensus these days that Taiwan is an independent and sovereign state.
After the election of pro-independence President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) in 2000, he declared his stance on the unification-independence issue in his "four noes" speech, saying that if China did not take military action against Taiwan, then Taiwan would not declare independence, that he would take charge of the National Unification Council, and that he would also be prepared to discuss a future "one China" with Beijing if that was what the Taiwanese public wanted.
During the last presidential election, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) also said that Taiwan would not declare independence if China does not attack Taiwan, which was very similar to one of the promises in Chen's "four noes," although Ma also added "no unification" and "no talks about unification," which were quite different from Chen's promise not to abolish the National Unification Guidelines.
This comparison clearly shows that Taiwan's self-awareness has affected both parties' stance on sovereignty and caused them to move from confrontation toward consensus. As a result, confrontation over the nation's sovereignty, which has been another source of "sanctity" in elections is weakening.
The last election also included two features differentiating it from past elections.
First, it was the first presidential election with no "charismatic star." In previous elections, candidates from both parties were political superstars with approval ratings reaching 70 percent or 80 percent, giving them almost godlike status in the eyes of voters. When Ma and Chen ran for the Taipei mayoral seat in 1998, Ma was such a candidate.
However, the image of local politicians has been damaged after years of political infighting. Although Ma may have a slight advantage in terms of charisma, his support ratings have dropped from 80 percent in the past to 40 percent or 50 percent, and even fell below 40 percent late last year, making this an election without any political superstars.
Second, debate between the government and the opposition on financial and economic issues surged during the last month of campaigning. This has never happened in any presidential election in the past, and is of course another sign that Taiwanese politics is increasingly no longer seen as a sacred occupation.
Both camps in fact devoted much time to discussing economic and trade relations with China as if they were discussing the unification/independence issue. That's probably because full direct links have yet to be implemented and economic and trade relations between Taiwan and China have yet to be normalized. Once that happens, however, the economic debate is also likely to be further detached from the unification/independences issue.
As the two camps move toward a consensus on the sovereignty issue, Taiwan's election atmosphere, issues and candidates are becoming less godlike and more a part of daily life. This is all evidence that we can look on this election as a milestone on the nation's development toward becoming a normal democracy. While mourning the DPP's election defeat, I also see this progress as a reason to rejoice. But having devoted my whole life to politics, I personally feel a sense of loss as the sanctity fades away.
Lin Cho-shui is a former Democratic Progressive Party legislator. Translated by Eddy Chang
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