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Learning from Tibet's experience

'China's strategy has been clear all along: It will hold on tight to what it already has and never let go; and it will also use threats and promises and all other possible means to obtain what it does not yet have.'

President-elect Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) may now be basking in a round of congratulatory messages on his landslide victory in last Saturday's election, but the road ahead promises to be a tough one as he has to deal with difficult issues, both domestically and internationally.

One of these tests will be Ma's strategy on China. During the last few days of the election campaign, China cracked down on protesting Tibetans, and when Ma met with reporters after casting his ballot, he emphasized that Taiwan is not Tibet.

This is correct: Taiwan is a free country born of the global third wave of democratization, while Tibet is an area enslaved by the Chinese communists. At the moment, the two could hardly be more different.

History shows, however, that Tibet also used to be an independent country. During the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) and the period of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) rule over China, the Chinese government only sent representatives to Tibet, and the Tibetan government was completely independent and autonomous. The fourth point in the peace agreement that representatives of the Dalai Lama signed under Chinese pressure in 1951 stipulates that: "The Central Authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet. The Central Authorities also will not alter the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama. Officials of various ranks shall hold office as usual."

When I met the Dalai Lama in New York in 1989, he said that after he signed the peace agreement, Mao Zedong (毛澤東) invited him to Beijing and personally promised that Tibet would be autonomously ruled by the Dalai Lama. Since the Dalai Lama was still young at the time, the central government had sent Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials Zhang Guohua (張國華) and Tan Guansan (譚冠三) to help him, Mao said, and if they did something wrong, the Dalai Lama could report this directly to Mao. He also said that Tibet could fly two flags, the Chinese and the Tibetan. But in the end all this counted for nothing.

China's strategy has been clear all along: It will hold on tight to what it already has and never let go; and it will also use threats and promises and all other possible means to obtain what it does not yet have.

If Taiwanese can stand united to protect Taiwan's freedom, democracy, independence and sovereignty and reject the so-called "1992 consensus," the "one China" principle and a peace agreement, then China cannot turn Taiwan into another Tibet and it will not dare invade Taiwan, turning Chinese President Hu Jintao's (胡錦濤) "Anti-Secession" Law into nothing more than a useless piece of paper.

But if Taiwan is internally divided and lets China apply pressure from the outside, while having the people who have joined up with China to suppress Taiwanese independence apply pressure from the inside, this double-edged pressure could force Taiwan's president to accept the so-called "1992 consensus" and the "one China" principle, muddle over Taiwan's independence, sovereignty and democracy, and instead sign a peace agreement with Hu. China is hoping for just such a historical opportunity to turn Taiwan into another Tibet.

Ma says there can only be talk on a peace agreement on the condition that China removes the missiles it has pointed at Taiwan. This condition is not enough. Former Chinese president Jiang Zemin (江澤民) had suggested to US President George W. Bush that China could remove the missiles if the US would stop its arms sales to Taiwan and force Taiwan to talk about a "one China" peace agreement to end the hostilities. The suggestion was rejected by both the US and Taiwan.

Hu's strategy for Taiwan is the "one China" strategy. He says China is willing to discuss anything as long as Taiwan recognizes the "one China" principle and gives up its sovereignty. This is Hu using all possible means and making both threats and promises to get his hands around the throat of the Taiwanese public. As soon as he gets a hold, he will act just as Mao did against the Dalai Lama in the 1950s. The CCP will be in total control of when to tighten its grip or strangle its victim, and if this happens, Taiwanese will never again be masters of their own country.

Ma said last year in Tokyo that once elected, he would implement the common vision reached by Hu and former Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairman Lien Chan (連戰) and turn these into policies, plans and agreements. This is absolutely unacceptable. Ma should carefully rethink his strategy toward China instead of perpetuating Lien's acceptance of Hu's "one China" strategy.

Ruan Ming is a consultant at the Taiwan Research Institute.

Translated by Anna Stiggelbout
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