There are too many variables -- both old and late-breaking -- to predict the result of today's presidential election: repression in Tibet and Chinese blustering on Taiwan, triumphal strutting by Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) legislators, KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou's (
Even so, there were signs as early as the legislative elections in January that things would not be so simple -- as in 2004. The sight of a grim-faced Ma standing with his KMT colleagues after wiping out the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in that poll was a clue: He must have known the result could be a double-edged sword.
The DPP has exploited fears of one-party rule for all they have been worth, even if the fear campaign has not been intelligently presented. The problem is not one party winning the game; rather, it is whether the organs of state can withstand partisan infection.
The biggest surprise of the campaign has been the wearing down of Ma's image from forthright to shifty -- literally, in the case of rapid changes in policy positions on unification talks, a common "Chinese" market and other hot button issues. Even with the tedious green card debate, Ma has been completely unable to shut the issue down.
Advertising by both parties has been largely negative, often preposterous. DPP candidate Frank Hsieh's (
Predictably, just when it seemed Hsieh had built up a head of steam, his habit of saying baffling and silly things let him down on Thursday when he suggested that the poll be postponed and the candidates start a sit-in to support Tibet. The impact on wavering voters could not have been helpful.
There has been widespread and justified criticism of the Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) administration, especially over corruption, though much of this criticism has been exaggerated, at times hysterical and all too often hypocritical. If he wins, Hsieh has a chance to correct Chen's errors and learn from the mistakes of the last eight years. But the DPP has shown little ability or interest in rejuvenating itself and seems unwilling to face up to its weaknesses and parochialisms. For Hsieh, the party is an albatross and may drive away the voters that gave Chen a second term.
If Ma wins this election, Taiwan will be in for a real show. Ma has proven himself to be a weak man, a political chameleon who does not reflect the core of the KMT; even his best efforts would not stop the reimposition of a professional network of kickbacks and partisan thuggery throughout not only the legislature but also the executive and perhaps the military and judiciary.
The KMT has campaigned for eight years to improve the cross-strait environment for business, but this necessary debate has been overwhelmed by its attacks on the independence of administrative agencies and populist ratbaggery on the streets and in the legislature. The KMT apparatus -- particularly party headquarters and the legislative caucus -- must be salivating at the prospect of returning to an era when party-state divisions were merely ceremonial.
All of this amounts to a degradation of democratic institutions that will make the DPP government's sins seem like the flailing of amateurs. But this is the KMT's paradox: Prematurely close engagement with China requires this degradation.
In the end, voters are left with a reversal of the choice that resulted in Chen's accidental presidency in 2000: The KMT stands for radical and possibly damaging political and economic change, despite its late words of caution, while the DPP offers another four years of what has become the domestic "status quo": modest economic growth, legislative gridlock and identity wars.
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