It is not the appropriateness of the Chinese Nationalist Party's (KMT) referendum boycotts that is dominating debate, nor is it the cloud of uncertainty surrounding KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou's (
As many believe that Ma has a good chance of winning the election, they are flocking to jump on the bandwagon and demonstrate their correctness. Even fair-minded individuals are keeping their silence, while the media are enthusiastically directing the watermelon effect out of fear of losing the chance to score points.
Taiwan has become a de facto "Watermelon Republic."
What is the watermelon effect? It is the psychological effect of being on the winning side. Other than hoping that their ballots are not wasted, voters want to be in the winning camp to avoid the psychological consequences of losing.
Voters therefore end up neglecting the candidates' political platforms and their relationship to their own welfare. Indeed, they deliberately ignore squabbles over the character of candidates, as these background noises would interfere with a sense of personal fulfillment. Perhaps this is the most deadly weapon in the current election.
The media help create an environment that fosters watermelon psychology. The question of a "one China" market is therefore covered up and disparities between promises and actions diminished so that Ma could emerge from the green card controversy with hardly a scratch. Boycotting referendums is also rendered inconsequential.
All this contributes to producing a climate in which Ma is guaranteed to win. The uncertainties of elections have completely vanished, and it would now be more unacceptable if Ma lost -- since the maintenance of the watermelon effect has become the common enterprise, or rather, a common conspiracy, of the public.
Therefore, the greatest danger posed by this election would be a Ma loss. The US authorities are keeping a friendly silence over the green card issue, while Beijing has retracted its claws and kept a low posture. Even the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) appears to be preparing for the transition of power.
If Ma fails to win the election, then -- aside from once again proving his lack of ability -- the greatest source of concern would be the irrationality of the watermelon effect.
A rational examination and comparison of the candidates' political histories, the effect of their efforts for Taiwan's democracy, the results of their previous terms of office, the uniformity and viability of their platforms and their regard for national security and sovereignty would yield a clear picture on who is best suited for office.
This is called independent judgment, which is the main motivation behind the establishment of an organization called the Intellectuals' Alliance: The hope that room for rational debate can be illuminated despite the spread of the watermelon effect.
Unfortunately, the watermelon effect has already become part of mainstream society.
The only thing that intellectuals can therefore do is serve as historical witnesses to another period of darkness and warn against the enormous impact and obscuring of reason that is the result of the watermelon effect.
For now we can only comfort the disappointed and the frightened, while hoping that fanning the flames of reason can light the way for Taiwan's democracy.
Hsu Yung-ming is an assistant professor of political science at Soochow University.
Translated by Angela Hong
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