Most people know little of marine policy and affairs, even though standards have long been practiced internationally. The content and scope of marine affairs in the international community can be gleaned from the Oceans and the Law of the Sea report put forward annually by the UN Secretary General to the General Assembly. In these reports, key topics include: the international development of the law of the sea and the opinions of different countries, sea transportation and safety, marine resources, marine environment, marine science and technology, and international cooperation and coordination, among other topics.
Some argue that the establishment of a marine commission is unnecessary, as the field is relatively new and there is a lack of professionals both within academia and without. This argument is far from the truth. Taiwan is a sea-bound country with a long and intimate relationship with marine affairs.
In terms of fishing, shipping, shipbuilding, navigation, port affairs, traditional marine industries, marine environmental protection, scientific research and energy exploration, Taiwan has an abundance of professionals. The importance of the ocean to Taiwan is far beyond being a mere environmental resource or tourism resource as some may suggest. In order to better control, conserve, and utilize the ocean, many Taiwanese professionals have silently made their contributions. For instance, faced with the several large oil contamination incidents and their aftermath, or the negotiation to enter fishing organizations or enforcing restrictions on fishing areas bound by cross government conventions, Taiwan would not have survived without the efforts of these specialists.
Currently, marine affairs are spread out among various bodies within Taiwan. However, various fields within marine affairs are strongly interrelated. Furthermore, the management of marine affairs often extends beyond the jurisdictions of a single nation. Hence the establishment of a government body responsible for marine affairs could integrate dispersed fields. Such a body would not only concentrate authority but would enforce the formation of marine policy and benefit the energy of the country's marine authority.
As for the integration of the Coast Guard Administration within the marine commission: aside from ensuring national maritime security, the Coast Guards' duties include maintaining marine traffic, sea rescues, first aid in disasters and patrolling and protecting fisheries, maintaining fishing resources, environmental protection, conservation, and others -- a broad field. If we could follow the examples of Canada and South Korea and integrate the Coast Guard into the marine department, then the marine policymaking body would have executive force at the same time. This would allow direct implementation of policies, and eliminate the previous problem of miscommunication between various organizations and the resulting inefficiency when marine related issues occur.
If a marine department were established to deal with marine affairs, the control of the seas would be improved. Under the current political climate, the establishment of a marine department, as hoped for by the marine industry and academia, may be better than a marine commission.
Raymond Chen is a student at National Cheng Kong University's Institute of Ocean Technology and Marine Affairs
Translated by Angela Hong
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