WHAT EXACTLY is the US' China policy, if there is one? A dissection of recent statements by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates doesn't leave one any the wiser.
Take the case of Taiwan, for instance. In her statement at a news conference, Rice sharply criticized Taiwan for its impending referendum to apply for UN membership under the name "Taiwan," calling it "a provocative policy."
"It unnecessarily raises tensions in the Taiwan Strait and it promises no real benefits for the people of Taiwan on the international stage," she said.
In a different context, Gates said at a Pentagon news conference, referring to his recent China visit and his talks in Beijing with his hosts, that "as long as they [Beijing] continued to build up their forces on their side of the Taiwan Strait, we would continue to give Taiwan the resources necessary to defend itself."
He said China's explanation that the recent cancelation of port visits by US warships to Hong Kong was linked to sales of US arms to Taiwan without prior notification to Beijing was "specious."
China's abrupt cancelation of a Thanksgiving visit to Hong Kong by the carrier Kitty Hawk and refusal to grant minesweepers shelter from a storm had rattled the Pentagon and senior naval officers.
From the US point of view it was obviously not a friendly act, but Washington these days goes out of its way to put a positive spin on anything China does. Gates said that this incident, as well as China's earlier test of an anti-satellite weapon, were possibly indications of "a disconnect within the Chinese government."
Was Gates really serious about this? Decisions to test an anti-satellite weapon or deny port visits are not spur of the moment acts. These usually have to go through layers of high level decision-making and can hardly be attributed to a political-military disconnect.
Washington is obviously not happy but, at the same time, keen to contain any serious damage to its relations with China.
Gates himself has said: "I don't consider China an enemy and I think there are opportunities for continued cooperation in a number of areas."
In Washington's delicate China diplomacy, Taiwan tends to get the rap now and then as with Rice's sharp rebuke. But it is not all negative for Taipei.
It can take comfort from Gates' reaffirmation of US resolve to help Taiwan defend itself against a Chinese attack.
He said in his news conference that: "In those conversations [with Chinese leaders during his November visit], they raised at various levels our arms sales to Taiwan, and I was very explicit that our arms sales were consistent" with US law and diplomatic commitments.
The point, though, is that unless Taiwan reinforces its identity in national and international terms, it will be absorbed by China in due course of time.
The referendum on UN admission might not produce immediate results in terms of membership, but it would pronounce Taiwan's determination to exercise its sovereign right to pursue its international interests. And it might make it difficult for China to claim responsibility for Taiwan.
It would also make it difficult for President Chen Shui-bian's (
Chen might be painted in China and, sometimes, in the US as a dangerous provocateur, but there is certainly a method to what he would like to achieve to solidify Taiwan's sovereign identity -- notwithstanding his unpopularity as demonstrated in legislative elections.
And one has to hand it to him that, even at this point in his political life, he is daring to go against all sorts of pressures from within and outside the country, particularly from the US.
Taiwan is at a very vulnerable point in its history. For the first time there are strong internal political forces, such as the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), that are keen to work out solutions with China that will compromise Taiwan's sovereign status.
There is no ambiguity about what China wants. Beijing has offered talks now and then, but based on its "one China" policy. Under this scenario, it is only a question of when Taiwan will become part of China.
By advocating a referendum on UN membership, Chen is seeking to involve Taiwanese in the future of their country. This is their democratic right.
It is not just that some in Taiwan's polity appear sympathetic to Beijing's overtures; China has also made great inroads into Taiwan's business establishment, which is attracted by that county's vast internal market and low-cost manufacturing.
Chen is apparently making a last ditch effort to rally Taiwanese to put a brake on the unseemly haste with which important figures in Taiwan's political and business establishment are courting China.
Why the US should oppose a referendum in Taiwan when seeking to promote democracy in the world is baffling to say the least.
Sushil Seth is a writer based in Australia.
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