In his report to the 17th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) National Congress, Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) showed a willingness to negotiate a formal end to the state of hostility and sign a peace agreement between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait based on the "one China" principle.
In an attempt to take the credit for this, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the People First Party (PFP) treated the proposal as the most valuable of treasures, saying it was exactly the consensus they had reached with the CCP. Some international media outlets also interpreted this as Hu holding out an olive branch to Taiwan.
However, the reason for cross-strait tension is not the lack of a peace agreement but that China is unwilling to give up the use of force as an option.
The proposal is also grounded in China's "Anti-Secession" Law. By accepting a faux peace agreement, Taiwan would endorse the "Anti-Secession" Law, which may affect its ability to maneuver in the international sphere.
The source of tension is not Taiwan and China's refusal to recognize each other.
Rather, it is China's insistence on maintaining a threat of force and its rapidly increasing military pressure.
Thus, the key to resolving cross-strait tension revolves around the question of China's willingness to give up the military option.
Since Taiwan has no intention to invade China, a cross-strait peace would be available if Beijing were to declare that it would not use force.
The question of whether the two sides can coexist peacefully is therefore not directly the function of a peace agreement.
Hu's proposal is based on the recognition that China is still in a state of civil war between the KMT and the CCP, mirrored in the definition of the cross-strait situation described in the "Anti-Secession" Law.
Accepting the need for a peace agreement also means accepting that China is still in a state of civil war. It also implies an endorsement of the cross-strait status quo as defined in the "Anti-Secession" Law.
The KMT and PFP's almost adulatory reaction to the proposal is either a display of ignorance of the proposal's legal standing or confirmation that they recognize the "Anti-Secession" Law.
Because any peace agreement would be based on this law, any acknowledgment that there is a need for such a peace agreement would have Taiwan fall into the law's trap.
What is a peace agreement that endorses this law, if not an agreement to surrender?
Nothing else is needed to resolve cross-strait tension. The key lies in the willingness to give up military threats. The so-called peace agreement is a non-issue.
Hu's proposal is therefore an extension of the "Anti-Secession" Law and makes the "one China" principle a precondition for any progress, hence this is a "non-peace agreement" that tries to rationalize China's agenda.
The KMT and the PFP's joy at this potential agreement raises strong suspicions that a pan-blue-camp victory in next year's elections would lead to a corresponding domestic law.
Lai I-chung is deputy director of the Democratic Progressive Party's Department of International Affairs. Translated by Eddy Chang
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