Washington officials have used several channels to tell Taipei that they are opposed to Taiwan holding a referendum on joining the UN, as the US believes that such a referendum would be dangerously close to voting on independence. The US, however, is in no position to oppose such the plan.
First, Washington has reacted too slowly to the subject. It wants Taiwan to give up the referendum, but it's clearly already too late. More than a month ago President Chen Shui-bian (
Moreover, he has been throwing around ideas about changing the nation's title, drafting a new constitution, starting a "second republic" and joining the UN for about a year. Political parties know that if Chen wants to do hold referendums alongside the presidential election, a referendum on joining the UN will be one of them.
Second, because the US' opposition to the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) defensive referendum in 2004 petered out, Washington has already lost its legitimacy to oppose the UN referendum. In the lead up to the 2004 election, the US began with stern admonitions not to hold the referendum. But that original bang ended up as just a whimper. This time, Washington complains that the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is not only unwilling to take the bullet for the US, but has proposed its own UN referendum. But the KMT has strongly rejected this, stopping just short of saying "the KMT doesn't want to be sold out by the US this time."
Third, both Washington and Beijing should analyze the pros and cons of a referendum on the UN. What both countries really oppose are referendums about Taiwan's future that could be disguised unification or independence referendums, or an official independence referendum.
DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (
Washington and Beijing should draw the line at an independence referendum, but not one involving joining the UN. After all, proposing to join the UN under the name Taiwan is, at most, just a small step above trying to join the WHO under the same name.
With the KMT deciding to follow the DPP with its own referendum, the US has lost an important lever to check the DPP. Beijing's three main points of support for opposing Taiwanese independence are Taiwanese public opinion, the pan-blue camp and the US. If the US continues to grumble at the pan-blue camp, and Beijing believes it has lost two of those supports, this will only deepen misunderstandings between Taiwan, the US and China. It will also sap the strength of the anti-independence cause.
Both the US and China believe that Taiwanese independence does not suit their interests, but if they want to maintain the anti-independence forces' strength, Washington and Beijing need to adjust their positions.
The US has always classified Taiwanese referendums into three categories: Independence versus unification; public policy and politically sensitive topics that might change the "status quo."
The US should convince China that even if Taiwan passes a UN referendum, it doesn't mean that Taiwan will enter the world body, so the referedum would not change anything. What would change the "status quo" would be for the US and China to work together to kill the UN referendum, thereby forcing Chen into a corner where he might push for a referendum on independence.
Edward Chen is a professor at Tamkang University's Graduate Institute of American Studies.
Translated by Marc Langer
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
As Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu’s party won by a landslide in Sunday’s parliamentary election, it is a good time to take another look at recent developments in the Maldivian foreign policy. While Muizzu has been promoting his “Maldives First” policy, the agenda seems to have lost sight of a number of factors. Contemporary Maldivian policy serves as a stark illustration of how a blend of missteps in public posturing, populist agendas and inattentive leadership can lead to diplomatic setbacks and damage a country’s long-term foreign policy priorities. Over the past few months, Maldivian foreign policy has entangled itself in playing
A group of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers led by the party’s legislative caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (?) are to visit Beijing for four days this week, but some have questioned the timing and purpose of the visit, which demonstrates the KMT caucus’ increasing arrogance. Fu on Wednesday last week confirmed that following an invitation by Beijing, he would lead a group of lawmakers to China from Thursday to Sunday to discuss tourism and agricultural exports, but he refused to say whether they would meet with Chinese officials. That the visit is taking place during the legislative session and in the aftermath