It is a sad state of affairs when even top US officials don't understand their own government's longstanding policies.
On Tuesday, the US Congress introduced a long-shot non-binding resolution that would call for the lifting of restrictions on high-level exchanges between Taiwan and the US.
Given the failure of such resolutions to make it through the Senate in the past, there seems to be little hope for the bill.
But what was disturbing on Tuesday was the interaction between Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte and his interlocutors on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Republican Representative Steve Chabot questioned Negroponte over the possibility of changing the government's stance on allowing senior Taiwanese officials to visit Washington.
"Taiwan has for many, many years now been a strong ally to the United States. They're a thriving democracy and it just seems like it's time for the United States to change its position to allow high-level officials from Taiwan to come here to our nation's capital," Chabot said.
Unsurprisingly, Negroponte poured cold water on the idea.
"I think we would have difficulties with what you propose mainly because of our `one China' policy -- our view that there is one government of China and that the government which we recognize as the People's Republic of China," Negroponte said.
"So we would not want to take any steps that might give the impression that somehow we now think otherwise," he said.
What is disturbing about these comments is Negroponte's apparent ignorance of the subtleties and nuance of the "one China" policy.
The "one China" policy, as it is formulated in the 1972 Shanghai Communique, is very explicit: "The United States acknowledges that Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States does not challenge that position."
A seasoned diplomat should be able to discern the difference between a "view that there is one government of China" and acknowledging "that Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China."
The formulation of "one China" in the communique is a masterpiece of diplomatic slipperiness. What does it mean to "acknowledge"? What does it mean to "maintain"? And most important, how does one define "Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait"?
The phrasing of the communique was designed to give the US government as much wiggle-room as possible. This is because the officials who devised it were not arrogant enough to assume that they knew what the future might hold for Taiwan and China and their relationship with the US.
Negroponte's comments, however, are just a sad reminder that the current US administration is a parody of the kind of statesmanship that once existed in Washington.
The unthinking embrace of what is basically the Chinese definition of "one China," rather than a defense of the longstanding US policy, shows how far Washington has fallen in its lack of imagination and competence.
There is no one in the US administration or in the world who knows how the "situation" in the Taiwan Strait will be resolved. Yet the Bush administration continues to indicate that it not only believes it knows what the future holds for this complex situation, but that it is simply tired of dealing with the complexities of Taiwan altogether.
How unfortunate that policymakers in Washington no longer seek to stand on the shoulders of giants, instead preferring to be led by dwarves.
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