Sadly, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is likely to push out some of the leading promoters of reform, a bit like when the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) forced out the pro-reform New KMT Alliance (
In future, it may turn out to be very difficult for those promoting reform to remain within the DPP.
Ideologically, the conservative faction within the DPP is different from the KMT, but the way this faction -- which favors President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) -- deals with its party rivals is no different from the way the conservative forces in the KMT dealt with its reformers: persisting in a hypocritical ideology to consolidate their conservative viewpoint and purge dissidents from the party.
They lack political ideals and democratic understanding but are highly proficient at political maneuvering and infighting.
Individuals capable of outstanding political performance have created a small and influential clique in the DPP, but lack political wisdom and the ability to set the agenda. Therefore, even if the DPP reformist faction decided to break away, its future political influence will be as transient as that of the New KMT Alliance.
Although the DPP started out as a reform party, it was basically only interested in reforming the previous government and the KMT, not the party itself. At the most, defeat in a major election will lead to the chairman stepping down. Ever since the DPP took over the reins of government, it has relied on chanting slogans of reform but failed to fulfill these slogans through action.
For example, when he was inaugurated in 2000 Chen vowed to abolish the death penalty, but after six years of DPP rule, the minister of justice is still ordering the execution of prisoners.
As political parties go, the DPP has grown over the past 20 years, but that growth has come from reforming the KMT and its government, not from reforming itself. After coming to power, there has been even less motivation to bring about reform than before. Electoral defeat may offer some stimulus, but the cure to all ills is the party chairman's resignation, and then things continue as before.
At the end of Chen's first term in office, the political crisis was quite obvious and there was a desperate need for intra-party reform. However, Chen's re-election in 2004 implied that the crisis was over and all passion for change disappeared.
In December 2004, when the DPP failed to garner a legislative majority, Chen resigned as DPP chairman, and when the DPP suffered another defeat in the mayoral and county commissioner elections in December 2005, another DPP chairman stepped down and the premier was replaced.
In the run-up to the 2005 mayoral and county commissioner elections, the new DPP movement -- initiated by Tuan Yi-kang (段宜康), then convener of the DPP's New Tide faction and Luo Wen-chia (羅文嘉), the DPP's Taipei County commissioner candidate -- received some positive responses from the public, prompting many DPP legislators to join a signature drive demanding party reform.
However, the DPP leadership managed to resolve the crisis with "great finesse," nipping the reform drive in the bud. Admittedly, in terms of reform, the DPP does not even come close to the past New KMT Alliance.
The DPP has no intention of reforming itself and has never done so. That is why the reformist faction within the party cannot make any progress in this regard. The reformers themselves are the main reason for the party's failure to reform. They lack the power and political wisdom required to propose effective change.
For the time being, the reformers still remain at the slogan stage and have yet to take action. One could even say that they seem to think that shouting slogans is the same as reform. The fact is that shouting slogans is a way to get others to take notice, but it is not the same as proposing a plan for overall party improvement.
In Taiwan's particular media environment, criticism of the DPP and the government makes for big news and creates the impression that those launching the criticism are reformers. In fact, this piecemeal criticism has turned those critical of the DPP into heroes.
That, however, is an empty image, since it has almost nothing to do with party reform.
The conservative pro-Chen forces who oppose these critics and even want to destroy them are actually doing a failed regime a favor. They are also following in the footsteps of the old KMT.
These political clowns may still have an audience, but they are bad news for the party. In a nutshell, the DPP leadership has yet to demonstrate adequate determination to overhaul the party, condemning the DPP to continue to sink.
Chiu Hei-yuan is a research fellow in the Institute of Sociology at Academia Sinica.
Translated by Daniel Cheng
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