Premier Su Tseng-chang's (
When President Chen Shui-bian (
Although the distrust of the pro-independence faction towards Su is not wholly unfounded, Su has had some success with restoring support for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the private sector with his business-friendly policies. Su projects the image of an outstanding, responsible administrator who gets things done with enthusiasm and integrity.
The only problem is, Su hasn't said anything about Taiwanese sovereignty -- a core issue for his party -- since taking office.
Chen's original plan was that Su would generate popularity for the party on one front. Su would court centrist voters with easy-to-understand policy successes. On the other front, Chen would rally the DPP's base voters by handling the sovereignty issue.
It was a plan to lay the foundation for winning next year's presidential election.
Last April, Su and Chen disagreed on the significance of a forum on economic affairs that was held in Beijing by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party without the blessing of the Taiwanese government. Intending to divide Chen and Su over cross-strait relations, the media said Su's views disagreed with the DPP's principles.
Chen responded by saying that the media was simply trying to foment division within the DPP.
For his part, Su formulated three guiding principles for cross-strait policies: Taiwanese consciousness, Taiwanese governmental oversight, and proactive policymaking.
The furor over Su's alleged disagreement revealed his weaknesses on the sovereignty issue. By failing to clearly express his views on cross-strait policies, the premier inadvertently opened the door to doubts about whether he was fully committed to Chen's policies or was intentionally wavering, intending to pursue his own vision of a political identity for Taiwan.
Su's three principles are clearly inadequate because they are neither a legal expression of Taiwan's sovereignty nor an emotionally compelling statement on identity.
Because he has failed to clearly and emphatically articulate his views on the sovereignty issue, independence fundamentalists continue to distrust him, even though he has committed himself to Taiwanese consciousness by making it his first principle for policy toward China.
The central question in cross-strait economic policy is not whether Taiwan should open up to China, but how to do it.
How should Taiwan effectively open up at an appropriate time and pace while protecting national security and Taiwanese consciousness?
The premier can indeed win swing voters and the private sector by allaying their concerns about the DPP's ideological stance on the sovereignty issue with policy initiatives that highlight his centrist values.
But I would urge Su to make up for his silence on the issue of Taiwanese consciousness even as he creates those centrist values. A substantive response to the expectations of voters who support a Taiwanese consciousness strongly is not only Su's duty, but also his mission.
Lin Te-yu is a commentator on political affairs.
Translated by Michael Fahey
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
As Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu’s party won by a landslide in Sunday’s parliamentary election, it is a good time to take another look at recent developments in the Maldivian foreign policy. While Muizzu has been promoting his “Maldives First” policy, the agenda seems to have lost sight of a number of factors. Contemporary Maldivian policy serves as a stark illustration of how a blend of missteps in public posturing, populist agendas and inattentive leadership can lead to diplomatic setbacks and damage a country’s long-term foreign policy priorities. Over the past few months, Maldivian foreign policy has entangled itself in playing
A group of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers led by the party’s legislative caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (?) are to visit Beijing for four days this week, but some have questioned the timing and purpose of the visit, which demonstrates the KMT caucus’ increasing arrogance. Fu on Wednesday last week confirmed that following an invitation by Beijing, he would lead a group of lawmakers to China from Thursday to Sunday to discuss tourism and agricultural exports, but he refused to say whether they would meet with Chinese officials. That the visit is taking place during the legislative session and in the aftermath