A few months ago, Evo Morales became Bolivia's first democratically elected indigenous head of state. Indigenous groups constitute 62 percent of Bolivia's population, and those with mixed blood another 30 percent, but for 500 years Bolivians had been ruled by colonial powers and their descendants. Well into the 20th century, indigenous groups were effectively deprived of a vote and a voice. Aymara and Quechua, their languages, were not even recognized for conducting public business. So Morales' election was historic, and the excitement in Bolivia is palpable.
But Morales' nationalization of Bolivia's oil and gas fields sent shock waves through the international community. During his campaign, Morales made clear his intention to increase state control over national gas and oil. But he had made it equally clear that he did not intend to expropriate the property of energy firms -- he wanted foreign investors to stay. (Nationalization does not, of course, necessarily mean expropriation without appropriate compensation.) Perhaps surprising for modern politicians, Morales took his words seriously. Genuinely concerned about raising the incomes of his desperately poor people, he recognized that Bolivia needs foreigners' expertise to achieve growth, and that this entails paying fairly for their services. But are foreign owners getting more than a fair rate of return?
Morales' actions are widely supported by Bolivians, who see the so-called privatizations (or "capitalizations") under former President Gonzalo "Goni" Sanchez de Lozada as a rip-off: Bolivia received only 18 percent of the proceeds! Bolivians wonder why investments of some US$3 billion should entitle foreign investors to 82 percent of the country's vast gas reserves, now estimated to be worth US$250 billion. While there has not yet been full disclosure of returns, or an audit of the true value of investments, it appears that investors would, at the old terms, have recouped all their money within just four years.
Bolivians also ask why foreigners reap all the benefits of today's high prices for oil and gas. It costs no more to extract oil or gas today than it did when prices were one-third of their current level. Yet, the foreign oil companies get 82 percent of the increase -- in the case of oil, this would amount to a windfall for them of US$32 a barrel or more. No wonder that Bolivians thought they were being cheated and demanded a new deal. On May 2, Morales simply reversed the percentages, pending renegotiation of the contracts: the companies operating in the two largest fields would get 18 percent of the production. As part of this new deal, Bolivia should also get a larger share when prices increase. (Bolivia may, of course, not want to bear the risk of a fall in the price, so it may strike a deal to transfer some of the downside risk to foreign companies, giving them in exchange more of the upside potential.)
To most Bolivians, what is at stake is a matter of fairness: Should foreign oil and gas companies get a fair return on their capital, or a supernormal return? Should Bolivia be paid a fair value for its resources? And should Bolivia, or foreign companies, reap most of the windfall gains from increases in energy prices?
Moreover, many deals were apparently done in secret by previous governments -- and apparently without the approval of Congress. Indeed, because Bolivia's Constitution requires the approval of Congress for such sales, it isn't clear that Morales is nationalizing anything: the assets were never properly sold. When a country is robbed of a national art treasure, we don't call its return "re-nationalization," because it belonged to the country all along.
As with many privatizations elsewhere, there are questions as to whether the foreign investors have kept their side of the bargain. Bolivia contributed to these joint enterprises not only with resources, but also with previous investments. The foreign companies' contribution was supposed to be further investment. But did they fully live up to their commitments? Are accounting gimmicks being used to overstate the true value of foreign capital contributions? Bolivia's government has, so far, simply raised questions, and set in motion a process for ascertaining the answer.
The problem in Bolivia is a lack of transparency when contracts are signed and afterwards. Without transparency, it is easy for citizens to feel they are being cheated -- and they often are. When foreign companies get a deal that is too good to be true, there is often something underhanded going on. Around the world, oil and gas companies have themselves to blame: too often, they have resisted calls for greater transparency. In the future, companies and countries should agree on a simple principle: there should be, to paraphrase President Woodrow Wilson's memorable words, "open contracts, openly and transparently arrived at."
If the Bolivians do not get fair value for their country's natural wealth, their prospects are bleak. Even if they do, they will need assistance, not only to extract their resources, but also to improve the health and education of all Bolivians -- to ensure long-term economic growth and social welfare.
For now, the world should celebrate the fact that Bolivia has a democratically elected leader attempting to represent the interests of the poor people of his country. It is a historic moment.
Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel laureate in economics, is professor of economics at Columbia University.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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