As a result of the first family's alleged involvement in a corruption scandal, the pan-blue camp recently announced a motion to recall President Chen Shui-bian (
Ma's previous stance was to give priority to a vote of no confidence in the premier over a presidential recall. Since the pan-blue camp enjoys a legislative majority, it should not be a problem to pass a vote of no confidence, which only requires half of the legislature to succeed. By contrast, the approval of two-thirds of all legislators is required to recall the president. Rashly proposing a recall motion will amount to a dud that may even blur the focus on the scandal allegations. When Ma decided to abandon the more feasible option for an unfeasible one he gave in to the demands of pan-blue supporters. Not only that, this also indicates that Ma has come to appreciate the political significance of a recall motion, even one that fails.
Ma's initial plan was to first topple the Cabinet and then recall the president. Even former DPP legislator Shen Fu-hsiung (沈富雄) described this as politically smart. If the pan-blue camp successfully forces the resignation of the premier, then Chen would have to once again form a minority government. With reduced legitimacy, the policy capacity of the new Cabinet would be even more restricted than its predecessor, causing more people to demand Chen's recall. If the pan-blue majority forms the Cabinet, no matter who serves as premier, the scandal allegations surrounding the first family will be the main target of judicial investigation. Chen will be lucky if he manages to stay on as a nominal head of state, but that could also change very fast, making him instead a jailed head of state.
In addition, if Chen decides to dissolve the legislature, the recent string of corruption allegations against Chen's family and entourage means that the DPP is unlikely to come out well in the ensuing legislative elections. The KMT's election platform would probably be to call on the public give them a two-thirds majority in the legislature so that it can successfully recall Chen. If the pan-blue camp garners more than two-thirds of the legislative seats, it would be a crushing defeat for the DPP and Chen would have to step down on his own initiative before being recalled by the pan-blue camp.
But because a vote of no confidence in the premier would deal a fatal blow to the DPP and Chen, why didn't KMT legislators support Ma's proposition to topple the Cabinet before recalling the president? The reason is very simple: Legislators fear a new election.
To begin with, the halving of the number of legislative seats in the next legislative elections, means that legislators within the same party will have to fight one another just to be nominated. Even if the pan-blue camp were looking to secure two-thirds of legislative seats, there are no guarantees for any of the incumbent legislators that they will be either nominated or elected.
With the exception of a few legislators that maintain a high profile, most KMT legislators spend an awful lot of money on their campaigns. Unless Ma can promise campaign funds to the tune of NT$100 million (US$3 million) per nominee, no KMT legislator will be willing to see the curtailment of their term.
Further, independent legislators have always opposed a vote of no confidence in the premier. The blue-camp's decision to push ahead, will force the currently blue-leaning independent legislators to into the arms of the DPP.
And finally, a vote of no confidence requires the support of more than half of all legislators to pass, no matter how many actually turn up to vote, which means that being absent is tantamount to opposing the motion. If the DPP manages to drive a wedge into the pan-blue camp causing some pan-blue legislators to be absent, the motion would not pass.
Reason dictates that toppling the premier targets the wrong guy, and the threshold for recalling the president is too high. Saying so only stresses the illegitimacy of these actions. But because these are political actions, the reasons are not important, nor is it important whether they succeed or not.
What does count are the benefits these actions bring. Recalling the president comes at no cost to legislators, but toppling the premier through a vote of no confidence and curtailing their legislative term most certainly would. Since the recall motion is directed at the president, it allows pan-blue supporters to vent their anti-Chen feelings regardless of the result. Removing the premier and Cabinet, however, will only make Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌) suffer, and will not provide a vent for anti-Chen sentiment.
The recall motion against Chen is not going to succeed, but at no cost, the process will satisfy the desire to give Chen a hard time and it will also consolidate pan-blue support. This will be advantageous to the KMT in the upcoming city council and legislative elections.
Jan Shou-jung is a legislative assistant.
Translated by Daniel Cheng
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