When President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) announced his proposal that it was time to seriously consider doing away with the National Unification Council and unification guidelines, many people thought that this suggestion was just a bid to win back the support of pan-green diehards, who had been sorely disappointed with what they saw as Chen's weakness on China. But this is an oversimplification of both his actions and his motives.
In 2004, when China's Taiwan policy began to emphasize preventing Taiwan's independence at the expense of promoting unification, it became possible for Chen to propose abandoning the unification discourse.
After all, if Beijing was no longer actively working toward unification, then abolishing the unification council and guidelines could present an opportunity for resolving the cross-strait situation.
This is similar to the "one country on each side of the strait" theory of cross-strait relations voiced in 2002, during which, in the expectation of China taking advantage of a strategic opportunity, the only way to break the impasse was to increase tensions.
On the other hand, if China refused to be moved by these proposals and rejected any contact with Chen, this would free the president to push the cross-strait discourse in Taiwan further toward independence, thus paving a path for future leaders to follow.
In fact, Chen's call to abandon the unification discourse is built on the same foundations as "one country on each side of the strait" -- namely, on the presence of a military threat and Taiwan's own democracy. The threat refers to the missiles that China has targeted at Taiwan, while the democracy is a call for all Taiwanese to have a say in deciding their own future.
The choice presented to the people should not be restricted to unification or the status quo. It should also include the choice of independence.
This is why Chen has repeatedly criticized Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Ma Ying-jeou's (馬英九) comments about "eventual unification."
At a time when China is working on all fronts to restrict Taiwan's room to maneuver -- on the political front, by appealing to Taiwan's opposition leaders, on the economic front by appealing to Taiwanese business interests in China, and on the military front by threatening Taiwan with missiles -- Chen's suggestion that the idea of unification be dropped needs to be supported by other measures.
As a countermeasure on the economic front, Chen put forward his policy of "active management, effective opening" during his New Year presidential address. Then there was his call for Taiwanese businesspeople to form an alliance in China, so that they could act in a more disciplined and coordinated fashion.
And again, if the arms procurement act is passed, there will be the chance of a US-Taiwan alliance to resist the threat of China's missiles. If abandoning the unification discourse can be tightly bound together with a commercial alliance of Taiwanese business interests and a military alliance with the US, then Chen will be able to step down in 2008 with the assurance of a job well done.
So, we should not over simplify Chen's actions. He is following his own logic.
After all, the fact that he has successfully prevented China, over six long and difficult years, from moving directly against him, proves that he knows what he is doing.
Wang Kun-yi is an associate professor at the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies at Tamkang University.
Translated by Ian Bartholomew
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