With rare exceptions, remarks by US political commentators regarding the difficulty Taiwan is facing in strengthening its own deterrent capabilities have been typically along the lines of "If Taiwan isn't interested in defending itself, the US shouldn't bother either."
There are at least a couple of points to make about this warning. The first concerns the effects of such a warning, and the second concerns its basic assumption.
Taiwan is a democracy with multiple voices. But with regard to cross-strait matters where the nation's security is paramount, there is an abnormal and bipolar division between the two main political camps. The pan-green camp is on the whole for strong deterrence and the pan-blue camp against it, and the difference in sentiment is growing in accordance with worsening political polarization.
In other words, The "deep blue" part of the political spectrum -- including most of the leaders of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the People's First Party -- basically favor a China-leaning disarmament for Taiwan.
To them, the issue of security will be a moot point once Taiwan is stripped of the prospect for formal sovereignty and "decides" to "unify" with China.
Conversely, it's the pan-green camp -- which includes the Democratic Progressive Party and the Taiwan Solidarity Union -- that would support a strong defense for the country.
These are the people who would like to see an eventual independent sovereign state. They consider adequate deterrence ability in alliance with the US and Japan as imperative to guaranteeing the nation's democracy as well as the freedom of the Taiwanese people.
The Sept. 25 demonstration in Taipei drew tens of thousands of independence-minded Taiwanese in support of beefing up the nation's defenses in general and passing the special arms procurement budget in particular.
Therefore, the warning outlined at the beginning of this article is essentially advocating an approach that only affirms the ironic adage: "No good deed should go unpunished." In this case, withholding defense help would punish those who support the arms procurement and reward those who oppose it.
Of course, one of the intended purposes of the warning is to alert Taiwanese voters so that they can pressure their political leaders to act on the arms bill. But both the deep-blue and the deep-green supporters are firmly committed to their respective causes and not particularly subject to persuasion.
The warning is really aimed at Taiwanese with moderate or no political leaning -- who constitute the overwhelming majority of the population. The problem is that these are the people who would tend to question the necessity of a costly arms build-up if the only purpose is to maintain a fleeting "status quo."
However, by excluding the truly indifferent as well as the pacifists, those remaining in this group would most likely be inclined to support strengthening defense if they believe that Taiwan has a chance to eventually become a normal sovereign state instead of being destined to "unify" with China.
Nevertheless, under the US "one China" policy, it would be difficult to convince this group of voters, especially while they are simultaneously being bombarded by daily propaganda coming from both pro-China media and pan-blue camp leaders.
As to the basis of the warning, it's rooted in the premise that the US commitment to aid Taiwan militarily is simply an obligation left over from switching recognition to Beijing in 1979 and that keeping Taiwan from being violently absorbed by China contributes to regional stability.
In fact, at the time the US withdrew its recognition of the Republic of China, many assumed that Taiwan would eventually be absorbed by China, and little consideration was given to Taiwan's strategic value.
But the strategic importance of Taiwan has evolved considerably from those early days.
To the US, keeping Taiwan out of Beijing's grasp -- at least in the foreseeable future -- is vital to US national security because of the explosive pace of China's arms build-up. If Taiwan falls -- peacefully or otherwise -- the subjugation of Japan to Beijing can only be prevented at an enormous cost.
And, if Japan submits to China's whims, the US will lose it influence in the Western Pacific and perhaps Southeast Asia as well. Therefore, Taiwan has the ominous potential of being the falling block that triggers a domino effect.
The US warning that it might withhold its support if Taiwan does not better arm itself does not make sense and is unhelpful. Instead, the US should soon realize that changing its "one China" policy is the most effective way of encouraging Taiwanese people to strive for sufficient deterrent capability and is also the only safeguard for preventing Taiwan from being stealthily absorbed by China.
Since vital national security interests are at stake here, the US government doesn't have the luxury for procrastination either.
Huang Jei-hsuan
California
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