The National Assembly has abolished itself and transferred to the public the power to approve constitutional amendments. In theory, this places more power in the hands of the people by giving them a final say in matters concerning the nation's future. In practice, however, it makes future constitutional amendments much more difficult.
This has made supporters of unification with China very happy, because it makes writing a new Constitution or passing amendments relating to the national title very difficult. Given the domestic and the international situation, this may be true.
Yet these people can see only one side of the issue, missing the point that it is equally difficult for those who would sell out Taiwanese sovereignty. These two opposing forces now find themselves in a stalemate.
This impasse is not harmful to Taiwan's sovereign status, and the delay in resolving the problem offers another means to maintain independence and sovereignty until Taiwan can become a regular state.
This coincides with demands from the US, Japan and other states that see the maintenance of the regional status quo as a strategic necessity.
Although the US does not want Taiwan to take drastic steps that would turn it into a renamed sovereign state, it cannot deny the fact that its status is that of a sovereign country.
On the other hand, although the US "acknowledges" China's position on Taiwan, it does not recognize Chinese claims to sovereignty over Taiwan.
Furthermore, the US has said that there must be a peaceful solution to cross-strait tensions, and that it will not tolerate military attempts or threats to change the status quo.
Finally, based on fundamental democratic principles and Taiwan's Constitution, any peaceful solution requires the approval of the Taiwan's people.
An invasion of Taiwan will be opposed by the US and Japan, while non-violent annexation will be opposed by the Taiwanese public. The stand-off is therefore clearly delineated.
Taiwan's weakening national defenses and China's rapid military build-up will change the power balance in the Taiwan Strait, but a Chinese annexation of Taiwan and extension of its borders to include Taiwan would, as a major shift in the regional power balance, be unacceptable to the US.
The US does not wish to see a changing balance of power in the Taiwan Strait, nor can it sit idly by and watch a disruption of that balance take place.
In the past, the US government demanded that Taiwan strengthen its national defenses and try to open a dialogue with China to cool down cross-strait tensions.
That policy saw dialogue as the means and the maintenance of a peaceful and stable status quo as the end.
As China's military steps up the threat to Taiwan, however, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the People First Party (PFP) continue to block the passage of the special arms budget in the legislature, raising concern over the cross-strait balance of power. KMT Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) and PFP Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) have also said "let things change if they have to," and traveled to China to express their sincere obeisance.
President Chen Shui-bian (
All this is having quite an impact on the so-called status quo.
Chen's talk of a meeting with Hu may be meant for US ears, but its impossibility is increasing Chen's problems. This will either result in mounting pressure on Chen or make him a laughingstock. Hu hasn't the slightest reason to want a meeting with Chen.
Hu seems to understand US policy more clearly than Chen does.
The US will not tolerate China taking over Taiwan by force or by threats to use it, and Hu knows that his best choice is to sow division by co-opting the KMT and the PFP and make Taiwan dismantle its national defenses and sovereignty.
It seeks to gain control of the pan-blue camp's localization faction from within this nation's democratic system. So why would Hu want a meeting with Chen unless it was only to accept surrender?
Chen has said that he is not afraid of delays. But procrastination is, in fact, a US strategy as well as an unavoidable Chinese strategy.
After World War II, the US contained every communist strategy, prolonging the impasse and forcing radical changes in the communist world.
The US can now deal with China's rise through two strategies -- contact and containment -- to see what direction China's domestic and foreign policy will take.
In other words, the jury is still out on what direction "China's rise" will take, and the US' China policy remains unclear in light of this.
Given the domestic and international impasse and the procrastination in waiting for changes in China, Taipei must, in addition to remaining firm in its defense of the nation's sovereign status, produce political results.
The easiest and most visible results will be in the areas of legislation, social order, white-collar crime, corruption, improving the investment environment and rebuilding an educational system focused on Taiwan and able to respond to the needs of high-tech industries.
Shen Chieh is a journalist based in Taipei.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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