President Chen Shui-bian (
The issues of referendum and constitutional amendments received considerable attention around the world during the last presidential campaign. After bilateral discussions, both Taiwan and the US agreed that there would be no unilateral change to the status quo, and that any change must be with the consent of the people of Taiwan. On the latter, China has never suggested it would agree.
The constraints on the procedure and the issues will have to be addressed. The debate of several constitutional amendments will require not only a three-quarters approval by the Legislative Yuan, but also an agreement through a referendum by a majority of more than one-half of the voters that are eligible to vote. If one ponders on past constitutional amendments during the Chinese Nationalist Party's (KMT) rule, when the most sensitive issues would not have been discussed in any event, much as are now required by law, but where procedural rules would be easier to accommodate, it still took considerable time.
In 1991 and 1992, following the lifting of the "Special Provisions," two amendments were passed. In 1994 several amendments were made, mainly replacing several made in the first two amendments. In 1997, amendments were made replacing the 1994 changes. Changes in 1999 were in part to be the same, but the Council of Grand Justices overruled them and there was no change. In 2000, changes were made, but only to the articles approved in 1997.
In other words, the 1947 Constitution promulgated in Nanjing had actually undergone some amendment, but only on a narrow set of issues. In a decade of rapid democratic change, constitutional changes did not keep the same pace.
During the last presidential campaign, the issues of referendum and constitutional changes got considerable attention. After the dust settled, how Taiwan was to deal with these potential provocations emerged which from the US standpoint at least, would prevent dangerous tensions in cross-strait relations: sovereignty, territorial and name issues would not be addressed in constitutional changes, referendums will be handled with care and the procedures for amending the Constitution should follow the law.
The use of referendum had been debated once before. In the last decade, there was a proposed amendment to the Constitution made by the KMT requiring that a victory in an election of a president must be by majority vote, not a plurality. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which had sufficient votes to prevent an agreement, insisted that this would be acceptable only if the use of referendum was approved as well. It did not happen, but it was close.
Ironically, the pan-blue majority in the legislature little more than a year ago, under public pressure, voted for a referendum law though it contained some of the same constraints and included the need for at least half of the number of citizens with a right to vote to approve. This is a formidable threshold, as seen in the effort to pass a referendum about a legitimate issue in the last presidential election.
The legal approval for phase I, which includes the Referendum Law (公投法), has been completed. Now it must be implemented. The most difficult part will be establishing the electoral districts.
That is not likely to be completed until the pressures of the next legislative election in 2008 force a final settlement. The organization that will produce the districts, and the membership in that organization, has yet to be determined.
Lawmakers who stand to lose office will not do so easily. District constituencies will be lobbying for advantage for their district, and party officials will worry over their candidates' chances for victory. For those interested in politics, there will be much to watch, but there will be attention on other political issues as well.
The government has laid out a very ambitious number of amendments to the Constitution that in other countries has taken years to determine: changing from a five-branch to three-branch system; presidential elections won by majority or plurality vote; compulsory or voluntary military service; lowering the voting age; parliamentary reforms and more protection of human rights, among others. This in the face of a majority domestic opposition in the legislature whose top objective is to undermine the DPP. The obstacles for Chen are massive.
Equally important is the need to address many domestic issues that not only need attention quickly, but will probably be followed more broadly by a much greater number of voters. Welfare, financial and economic issues will be followed most eagerly, not to speak of security, cross-strait and other external issues that the government must address.
It will be of great interest abroad as well as domestically, just how much recent events may change the outcome of these objectives. We have seen more than ever before efforts to develop a consensus on Taiwan's identity, and China's shift of policy placing greater attention on Taiwan's domestic politics while increasing its efforts to isolate Taiwan and broaden its provocations on security matters.
China still opposes Taiwan's referendums and changes to its Constitution. The shape of opposition parties in the next year or so, and their willingness to use relations with China in domestic politics, remains unclear. We have seen that Chen has enormous obstacles in reaching his objectives for reform. Perhaps the biggest is uncertainty.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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