"Unhelpful." That's how Washington described China's new "Anti-Secession" Law, authorizing the use of "non-peaceful means" if the potential for peaceful reunification with Taiwan is "completely exhausted." I beg to differ.
As it turns out, the law has proven to be very helpful -- to everyone but Beijing, that is.
The law has turned a potential diplomatic embarrassment for President George W. Bush into a diplomatic victory. Earlier this year, the EU seemed intent on lifting its arms embargo against China (in place since the 1989 Tiananmen tragedy), despite -- or perhaps because of -- strong pressure from the White House and Congress.
The Anti-Secession Law gave the Europeans a face-saving out. It "created quite a difficult political environment," lamented one proponent of lifting the ban; others acknowledged that "the timeline has become more difficult."
As a result, the lifting of the EU embargo, which seemed a sure bet in December, in all likelihood will now be "postponed" until next year. By passing the law, Beijing snatched defeat from the jaws of victory in its diplomatic contest with Washington, while boosting -- or at least preventing a further deterioration of -- Washington's relations with Brussels.
Helpful as the new Chinese law was to transatlantic relations, it was even more helpful to its intended target, President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). Chinese officials have argued that the new law was necessary to check Chen's "splittist" ambitions. But his ruling coalition experienced a major setback in December when it failed, despite Chen's own brash predictions, to win a majority in the legislative elections.
Chen's "in-your-face" policies toward Beijing were seen as a major contributing factor in the defeat and his post-election tone has become far more conciliatory.
Why then did Beijing feel compelled to proceed with the law? Apparently, by the time Beijing realized that Chen's coalition would not prevail in the legislative elections, the political momentum (read: high-level leadership support) for the law was too great to turn it off.
Besides, Beijing interlocutors argued, the election setback had not caused Chen to change his objectives, only his tactics. The counter-argument -- that the law would breathe new life into the pro-independence movement -- fell on deaf ears in Beijing.
But even the hard of hearing could not miss the collective voices of about a million Taiwanese, who took to the streets this past weekend to voice their displeasure over the law, in a demonstration smoothly orchestrated by the Chen government.
As many had warned, Beijing's heavy-handed action revitalized Chen's coalition and put the opposition on the defensive once again.
The big question is, "what happens next?" Does the law make further progress in cross-strait relations unlikely -- ? if not impossible -- as its critics argue, or does it, as Beijing contends, open the door for further progress as long as Taiwan does not take irreversible steps toward independence?
After all, the refusal to rule out the use of force is nothing new; this has always been a major element of Beijing's cross-Strait policy. Passing a law -- in a country where the rule of law is, at best, applied selectively -- hardly makes an attack any more (or less) likely.
More relevant, and considerably more promising, than Article Eight -- the "non-peaceful means" clause -- is Article Seven, which affirms that "the state stands for the achievement of peaceful reunification through consultations and negotiations on an equal footing between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait." Even more intriguing is the acknowledgment that "these consultations and negotiations may be conducted in steps and phases and with flexible and varied modalities."
While an earlier article notes that "upholding the principle of one China is the basis of peaceful reunification," there is no specified requirement in the law for Taipei to accept the "one China" principle as a precondition for starting the process of consultations and negotiations.
Does this mean that Beijing is prepared to be more flexible on this point? Who knows, but it would be irresponsible of Taipei to overlook this possibility, since it could be the key to a resumption of cross-strait dialogue.
As I read the law, China is not demanding that Taipei accept the "one China" principle, only that it not take any action that "completely exhausted" the possibility.
It remains unclear what "flexible and varied modalities" are acceptable to Beijing. An acknowledgment by Taipei that "an agreement to disagree" over the interpretation of "one China" previously existed -- the so-called "1992 consensus" that allowed earlier direct cross-strait dialogue to occur -- might suffice.
President Chen himself hinted at such an agreement when, in his National Day speech last October, he proposed that "both sides use the basis of the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong ... as preparation of a step forward in the resumption of dialogue and consultation."
If the leadership in Taiwan is prepared to move beyond the emotional aspects of the law and creatively test its possibilities, and the leadership in Beijing is serious when it asserts that the law opens rather than closes the door for meaningful dialogue, then the Anti-Secession Law might yet prove helpful to both Taipei and Beijing.
Ralph Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute.
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