Several recent major incidents, such as the tsunami disaster in Asia, Taiwan's diplomatic setbacks, and President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) state trip to Taiwan's Pacific allies, have all centered on a group of nations that have long been ignored by the international community.
The tsunami-ravaged Republic of Maldives and Sri Lanka, Chen's visit to Palau and the Solomon Islands, the recent severing of diplomatic ties with Grenada and Vanuatu, and even Taiwan itself with its substantial geographic territory, are all issues involving "small island states."
For the Taiwanese, these states, with the exception of Taiwan itself, are no more than tourist resorts or figures in the tally of Taiwan's diplomatic allies. In fact, everyone seems to have overlooked how vitally inter-related the survival and development of these nations is with our own stability.
The Dec. 26 tsunami disaster, was also related to the deterioration of the global ecological environment. As early as Nov. 2001, Tuvalu, one of our diplomatic allies in the South Pacific announced that all its people would migrate to New Zealand as a result of its gradually diminishing geographic territory.
A storm hitting the South Pacific in Nov. 2003 also caused many islands to be completely submerged, including nine islands in Tuvalu. Besides, in this tsunami, a half of Male, the capital of the Maldives, was inundated, and the Maldives Tourist Office even ran an ironic advertisement urging tourists to come and visit Maldives before it is too late. As a result, this kind of ecological disaster is forcing a re-evaluation of the conventional conception of national sovereignty as being of the first importance.
Therefore, globalism in the post-Cold War era emphasizes cooperation among sovereign nations so that, on one hand, we can negotiate enforceable international covenants; and on the other hand, attempt to establish corresponding international organizations -- or supervisory regulations -- for these policies.
The aim is to draw strength from many nations in order to achieve solutions. It is ironic that even before these small island states can catch up with the changing concept of national sovereignty, the very thing that defines them as a nation -- namely, their territories -- may be obliterated.
In 1994, with support from the UN, a number of small island states established the Alliance of Small Island States, to jointly formulate policy in response to this situation. Currently, membership includes 43 island states and territories. Unfortunately, the key problems that face these island states, including the question of the rising ocean level and marine ecological conservation, sovereignty and relocation are beyond the ability of these generally poor, backward nations with small land areas and small populations to solve.
It is no surprise that these island states hope for the support of more technologically advanced and economically developed Western nations, which are mostly continental powers. But then, with the US refusing to sign the Kyoto Protocol, and with Australia using harsh immigration conditions to restrict access by Tuvalu islanders seeking to enter the country with "refugee" status, conditions that are little different from the outright rejection of immigration from the island group, it is clear that larger sovereign nations are the ultimate arbiters for the distribution of the world's resources; but also that globalization cannot counterbalance the demands of national interests.
The fact is that the major Western powers, in dealing with climate and other environmental issues, limit themselves only to consideration of their own political and economic interests, and consult only their own sense of urgency, as the standard by which they decide whether or not to take action.
Therefore, the problems faced by island nations that exist on the world's political fringe are often ignored by the major powers.
While major powers in Europe, the US and Asia can ignore this situation, an island nation like Taiwan cannot. Island nations like Tuvalu now face the threat of total obliteration, and this may not be much different from the fate Taiwan might face in a few decades. The parts of Taiwan most at risk are Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu, Green Island and Little Liovciou. Faced with such problems, we should not only call on the government to amend current regulations regarding the distribution of funding for maritime research to ensure the sustainable development of Taiwan's maritime environment, it can also provide a reference point for the government in its diplomatic strategy.
One-third of Taiwan's diplomatic allies are island nations. As a relatively large nation among these tiny nations, Taiwan's government should seek to find answers to the problems these allies face, benefiting others as well as benefiting itself in the process.
On the one hand, Taiwan should strengthen research into global warming and rising sea levels, and in consultation with these island nations, formulate guidelines for the sustainable development of small island nations.
Taiwan should also strengthen environmental monitoring of its coastal regions and develop technologies that can be used to ensure the conservation of these areas. This is not only in line with the government's policy of promoting the spirit of a "maritime nation" and a "green nation" in Taiwan, it will also prepare Taiwan for future environmental disasters.
By transferring technology to allied countries, Taiwan will be able to assist its allies to build up the same ability to respond to the changing environment. In this way, Taiwan will be able to break the mind set of "dollar diplomacy" and become an ally who can help these island nations face the threat of potential extermination.
Taiwan should also seek membership in the Alliance of Small Island States, so that this can serve as a platform for it to provide technology and expand the scope of ecological diplomacy with other small island states. Nine members of the alliance, almost half the total membership, already have diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
More importantly, nationhood is not a condition for membership, for both Guam and American Samoa are observers, and China does not qualify for membership, thereby depriving it of leverage in denying the legitimacy of the application for membership by Taiwan.
Still more importantly, by joining an international organization in which members are predominantly developing nations, Taiwan would be able to use its economic and technological advantages to increase the international recognition of this organization.
Once established within this organization, Taiwan would be able to become an effective example for member islands on the issues of the environment and development, rather than just serving as cannon fodder in the confrontation between major powers in the Asia Pacific.
Only by redefining Taiwan's place in the region's geopolitics can we break out from our current diplomatic difficulties.
The government might well take advantage of President Chen's visit to the Marshall Islands in May to announce Taiwan's new policy on ecology and the marine environment, and offer something new to our diplomatic allies.
If we continue to maintain the mentality of a continental power and ignore the difficulties of other small island nations, Tuvalu will not be the last island to disappear beneath the ocean.
Bernard Chih-chieh Chou is an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and Graduate Institute of Political Economy at the National Cheng Kung University.
Translated by Lin Ya-ti and Ian Bartholomew
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