Ever since North Korea declared that it had started manufacturing nuclear arms and asserted that those weapons were no longer negotiable, leaders in Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, Beijing, Moscow, and the UN have been scurrying to persuade, cajole, or force the North Koreans to return to the negotiating table.
Maybe that is the wrong way to confront this issue. More than two years of negotiation have proven futile. An alternative, military force, is an option that nobody in any capital wants because it would cause unspeakable death and destruction.
Perhaps it is time for the US to adopt a third option, which would be to disengage itself completely from the Korean peninsula.
Complete US disengagement would mean:
1) Walking away from the six party talks in Beijing, cutting off all communication with Pyongyang, strengthening economic sanctions, and warning North Korea that any military threat to the US, to US forces in Asia, and to US allies would be met with terrible retribution.
2) Withdrawing all US forces from the peninsula and abrogating the US-South Korea mutual security treaty because of rampant anti-Americanism in Seoul, a rising tendency to appease North Korea, and a penchant for blaming the US for blocking reunification.
On the future of Korea, the US would tell South Korea and North Korea that they themselves must resolve the question of reconciliation or reunification but not to expect American political or economic help. As the UN Command in Seoul would be dissolved, the UN would be advised that its Security Council would be responsible for executing whatever policies were decided for Korea.
Elsewhere, the US assures the Japanese that the withdrawal applied only to Korea and that the US would fulfill all of its security obligations to Japan.
In addition, the US would pledge full support to Japan in dealing with North Korea on the issue of abducted Japanese citizens and would back Japan on whatever economic sanctions it decided to apply to Pyongyang.
Similarly, Washington would reassure Taiwan that the US would continue to meet its obligations to help defend that nation under the Taiwan Relations Act. The US would reassure treaty allies in the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, and friends such as Singapore, that the US was not pulling out of Asia.
Further, the US would tell the Chinese, who have been hosts of the Six Party Talks intended to dissuade North Korea from its nuclear ambitions, that the US would quietly support Beijing's efforts to contain North Korea.
Just as the US does not want North Korean missiles aimed at Okinawa or Hawaii, so the Chinese do not want North Korean nuclear arms facing them across the Yalu River.
The consequences of the US disengagement from Korea would be several. Perhaps most telling would be a more intense isolation of Pyongyang from the outside world. That, in turn, might well increase the internal pressures for reform and even regime change within North Korea.
North Korea's economic disasters resulting from mismanagement and natural causes are well known. Now, even though it is a hermit kingdom, hints are leaking out that not all is well politically and that dissent has begun to rumble through Kim Jong-il's government. Perhaps the regime of the "Dear Leader" will collapse of its own misdeeds.
An American disengagement from Korea would most likely nudge Japan to accelerate its already steady move toward a more assertive security posture, which the US would welcome. There is no reason to believe, however, that this would push Japan to acquire nuclear arms
China would be faced with a critical decision. Some years ago, Chinese leaders quietly told American officials that they would do whatever was necessary to keep North Korea afloat and that they have the foreign exchange reserves, which are the world's largest, to do it. Chinese leaders may have since changed their minds and would see Kim Jong-il's departure as advantageous.
For the US, the main benefit of disengagement would be freeing American troops in Korea for duties elsewhere. US forces are stretched thinly around the world and obtaining the services of those in Korea would be welcomed in the Pentagon. Those troops would not go to Okinawa, where there is already friction between Japanese and Americans, but could be posted in Guam, Hawaii, or the US mainland.
The chances of this strategy coming to pass are limited because it is too unconventional and all political leaders seem to be pursuing negotiations. But maybe this is a time for imaginative, alternative thinking.
Richard Halloran is a journalist based in Hawaii.
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s (李顯龍) decision to step down after 19 years and hand power to his deputy, Lawrence Wong (黃循財), on May 15 was expected — though, perhaps, not so soon. Most political analysts had been eyeing an end-of-year handover, to ensure more time for Wong to study and shadow the role, ahead of general elections that must be called by November next year. Wong — who is currently both deputy prime minister and minister of finance — would need a combination of fresh ideas, wisdom and experience as he writes the nation’s next chapter. The world that
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
As Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu’s party won by a landslide in Sunday’s parliamentary election, it is a good time to take another look at recent developments in the Maldivian foreign policy. While Muizzu has been promoting his “Maldives First” policy, the agenda seems to have lost sight of a number of factors. Contemporary Maldivian policy serves as a stark illustration of how a blend of missteps in public posturing, populist agendas and inattentive leadership can lead to diplomatic setbacks and damage a country’s long-term foreign policy priorities. Over the past few months, Maldivian foreign policy has entangled itself in playing