The overall death toll has now reached almost 221,000 following the quake-spawned killer waves that occurred off Sumatra last month. Indonesia and Sri Lanka were the worst-hit nations.
ASEAN, the EU and the UN have all held international conferences to discuss and coordinate post-disaster relief efforts. The relief aid to tsunami-devastated countries provided by the international community has gone from a phase of search and rescue operations to a phase of post-disaster reconstruction.
On the surface, major powers offered their rescue operations out of humanitarian concerns. But they also hoped to gain substantial political, diplomatic or military benefits in the process. This is true of the US and Japan. It is also true of China. Worried about being criticized for being stingy with aid contributions, donor countries, after comparison with each another, greatly increased their financial commitment. Obviously these arrangements are all based on strategic considerations.
US President George W. Bush hopes that the US relief effort will help establish a cooperative relation with Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and will also pacify Indonesia's discontent over the US war against Iraq and reduce the threat of terrorism. Last year the Bush administration granted Indonesia a five-year financial aid package worth US$470 million. Now, as a result of the tsunami devastation, the US is in a stronger position to assist a South Asian economic recovery.
Before the tsunami, the US had envisioned cooperation on maritime security in the Malacca Strait, an idea resisted by both Malaysia and Indonesia. However, the US can now make use of its influence on Indonesia to increase its surveillance of the strait.
Japan's strategic goal has been to seek diplomatic support and demonstrate that its Self-Defense Force can play a stabilizing role in Asia. Australia's aid to Indonesia is in part motivated by the desire to ameliorate relations soured by the issue of East Timorese independence. The US-led "core group" following the tsunami has excluded China.
During the recent tsunami aid summit in Jakarta, however, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶) once again expressed his country's neighborly attitude, announcing that China's enterprises will participate in the reconstruction and that the Chinese government will write off Sri Lanka's debts of US$4.3 million, hold international symposiums to discuss tsunami alert systems, assist the devastated countries in establishing the network to predict and monitor earthquakes and tsunamis.
Although restricted politically, Taiwan still clearly showed the world that it is able to pitch in and help.
Taiwan has pledged to donate US$50 million in disaster relief, US$20 million of which will be donated in the form of food supplies. Another US$15 million will be donated in medical assistance and the remaining US$15 million will go to the reconstruction of communities and harbors.
Bearing the brunt of the tsunami destruction are Indonesia and Thailand, with both of which Taiwan has close relations. With a new government just having taken power in Indonesia and a national election about to take place in Thailand, Taiwan has to count on delicate diplomacy to improve its relationships there.
On the other hand, the US, Japan, India and Australia have actively engaged in disaster relief aid, altering the structure of multilateral relations in South Asia. More importantly, China's increased power and influence in South Asia has also been counterbalanced in the process.
Lin Cheng-yi is the director of the Institute of European and American Studies at the Academia Sinica.
TRANSLATED BY DANIEL CHENG
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
As Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu’s party won by a landslide in Sunday’s parliamentary election, it is a good time to take another look at recent developments in the Maldivian foreign policy. While Muizzu has been promoting his “Maldives First” policy, the agenda seems to have lost sight of a number of factors. Contemporary Maldivian policy serves as a stark illustration of how a blend of missteps in public posturing, populist agendas and inattentive leadership can lead to diplomatic setbacks and damage a country’s long-term foreign policy priorities. Over the past few months, Maldivian foreign policy has entangled itself in playing
A group of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers led by the party’s legislative caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (?) are to visit Beijing for four days this week, but some have questioned the timing and purpose of the visit, which demonstrates the KMT caucus’ increasing arrogance. Fu on Wednesday last week confirmed that following an invitation by Beijing, he would lead a group of lawmakers to China from Thursday to Sunday to discuss tourism and agricultural exports, but he refused to say whether they would meet with Chinese officials. That the visit is taking place during the legislative session and in the aftermath