On Dec. 14, President Chen Shui-bian (
Chen said that he resigned to take responsibility for the election failure. Did the DPP really lose? A myth about the elections for the Sixth Legislative Yuan is the blue camp's victory. Whether judged by the percentage of votes or the number of legislative seats held, not only did the pan-green camp not lose, but it also grew slightly, remaining the biggest party in the legislature. In comparison, the 114 seats won by the pan-blue camp are actually one seat fewer than before. Its so-called victory is therefore exaggerated.
But why do the public have an illusion that the pan-blue camp won the elections? The reason is that the DPP caused a sensation by taking the lead in major campaign issues, which led to the prediction that the pan-green camp would win the majority this time, or perhaps neither the pan-green nor pan-blue camps could gain the majority. Most people did not believe that the pan-blue camp would be able to win a majority. Even the blue camp itself was not confident about it. This could be seen from the Chinese Nationalist Party's (KMT) prediction which seats it would win.
Due to the gap between the election results and the public's prediction, we immediately have an impression that the pan-blue camp won and the pan-green camp lost the elections. Thus, the pan-blue camp's perceived victory is a result of the two camps' expectations for the elections.
Another reason for the impression of the pan-blue camp's victory is that, during the campaign, the pan-blues advocated maintaining the status quo, while the pan-greens advocated changing the country's name, thereby altering the status quo. Whether Taiwan's status quo would be changed depended on whether the pan-green camp could win the majority. Since it failed to win the majority, its attempt to change the status quo also failed. Naturally, the public thinks the pan-green camp lost the elections.
Nevertheless, no matter how people "feel," a real victory depends on the percentage of votes and the number of legislative seats won by the two camps. Viewed from this perspective, the pan-blues have merely retained their seats, and this cannot be called a victory.
In fact, the pan-blue camp is facing new crises after the elections. For example, with the KMT celebrating its victory, the People First Party (PFP) is angry about the election outcome -- because the KMT's gains are based on the PFP's losses. Since it failed to expand its supporter base, the KMT's victory meant the PFP's defeat. The redivision of the pan-blue camp's political map will certainly aggravate the two parties' conflicts, making it even more difficult for them to merge in the future.
If the gap between the KMT and PFP continues to grow, not only will the two parties be unable to merge, they may further separate as each goes its own way. As for a split pan-blue camp and a united pan-green one, the question of which camp will have an upper hand in the legislature is self-evident. How can the majority possibly benefit the pan-blue camp if the opposition parties "appear united outwardly but are divided at heart," as the Chinese saying goes?
Another concern of the pan-blue camp is that the KMT, which plays a leading role in the alliance at present, always fails to stand up to the test of victory. The party becomes highly conceited whenever it wins an election, and puts aside necessary reforms it promised. By the KMT's nature, its organizational, personnel, and administrative affairs are out-of-date. Calls for reform are common.
For this election, the KMT was willing but so unable to find even one brilliant young member as a candidate for legislator-at-large that it recruited Olympic taekwondo silver medalist Huang Chih-hsiung (
Moreover, all parties should learn from mistakes of the past. The KMT should realize that the election results only allow it to take a breath, as the party still has to accelerate internal reforms. How long will the handling of its inappropriately obtained assets be delayed? This will serve as an index for the public to examine its sincerity for reform.
Whether the KMT and PFP can merge after the elections also poses a major test for the pan-blue camp's leaders. If the two parties' relationship deteriorates after winning the majority together, then their voters may get a sense of being fooled. During the campaign, the pan-blue camp repeatedly stressed the significance of a strong opposition. After their voters granted them a majority, it will absolutely lose its legitimacy and people's trust if the opposition parties fail to unite to supervise the DPP government.
Another Chinese saying goes, "In fortune lies the seed of misfortune," and vice versa. Although the pan-blue camp is secure at this time, this does not guarantee a smooth journey in the future. The Taiwanese people are watching what's happening. After the elections, key DPP leaders examined themselves and stepped down from their posts to take responsibility.
As for the pan-blue camp, the public will surely remember the performance of its leaders, and compare it to that of the pan-green camp leaders, which might have an impact in the future.
Kao Lang is the director of the department of political science at National Taiwan University.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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