The election of the Sixth Legislative Yuan has come to a close. It may have been the last time a democratic country uses the single non-transferable vote with a multi-member district system. As the system passes into history, all its special features were played to the hilt during this fierce election campaign.
Throughout the campaign -- which was geared solely towards sensational issues and ignored all policy debate -- both the pan-blues and the pan-greens have made winning a majority of seats -- not votes -- their greatest concern. With the aim of winning a legislative majority, both camps have made vote allocation and tactical voting their campaign strategy of choice.
ILLUSTRATION: MOUNTAIN PEOPLE
The results of the elections have turned back the clock, and the promise for a new era of "green government" represented by the re-election of President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) has not been realized, as the pan-blue camp maintained its majority in the legislature by winning 114 seats to the pan-green camp's 101 seats, and the 10 seats won by independents.
As a result, the legislative environment retains the possibility of dynamic interaction, and the importance of the Non-Partisan Solidarity Union (NPSU, 無黨聯盟) and independent legislators will increase. The NPSU will not easily enter into a permanent alliance with the green camp. At the very minimum, they will maintain their freedom in the short term: cooperation with the pan-green or pan-blue camp on an issue-to-issue basis will be their best choice.
As the pan-blue camp has won a clear majority, this cannot be considered a successful election for the pan-greens.
Nevertheless, although the pan-green camp did not realize its hopes of winning a majority, its position in the legislature is stronger than it has been for the last three years. It still has the opportunity of gaining support from the NPSU and some Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) legislators, but it will have to work harder to win such support than ever before. This means the continuance of a situation in which the government has no guarantee of obtaining a majority within the legislature, and this will cause significant difficulties as regards policy implementation and passing legislation. It will now be essential to Chen's policy implementation that the green camp manages to convince some legislators from the NPSU or the KMT to join it to form a legislative majority to push through legislation.
The pan-blue camp now has the slimmest majority it has ever held in the legislature. The possibility that pan-blue legislators would choose to leave to join the pan-green camp has been greatly reduced, although quite a few variables remain regarding the issues of the pan-blue camp's internal power transition and party mergers.
When it comes to the issue of a transition of power, KMT Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) is all but certain to resign, but timing of such an event and the selection of a successor -- whether Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) or Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) will take over as chairman -- will probably be delayed. As for the proposed merger between the KMT and the People First Party (PFP), the latter's poor performance and the fact that it now has fewer seats than before, in addition to grudges between the two parties' legislators stemming from the election campaign may mean that there will be changes to the timing of a merger.
After the new legislators are sworn in on Feb. 1, the first item on the political agenda will be the formation of a new Cabinet. In particular, the choice of premier will be relevant to the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) power structure in the post-Chen era. As the results of the election have diverged so significantly from the green camp's hopes and expectations, Chen will be put under much greater pressure in his selection of premier, the creation of a new Cabinet and a reshuffle of the DPP leadership. Premier Yu Shyi-kun's chances of continuing that job are much reduced, and the new premier will be faced with an unfriendly legislature in which the blue camp holds a majority. Although the premier will still have to face considerable difficulties, he will be in a stronger position than before to attain legislative goals and win popular approval for the government.
The most crucial factor in the nomination of a new premier is, however, Chen's personal attitude and will.
As soon as it meets, the legislature will also be faced with numerous sensitive political issues, including the special arms budget bill and the reform of the constitutional structure. These issues are not only controversial on the domestic political front, they will also affect the interaction between the US, China and Taiwan. As for amendments to the Referendum Law, the National Emblem Law and the renaming of Taiwan's representatives abroad, these issues will certainly impact on relations across the Taiwan Strait.
Although Chen has proposed convening a non-partisan Committee for Cross-Strait Peace and Development after the elections, the opposition parties -- and China -- have not shown much enthusiasm for the idea.
Chen's goodwill gestures toward China, including his May 20 inauguration speech, his Double Ten National Day speech and his "Ten Points" announced on Nov. 10, have all failed to elicit a response from China. But in the run-up to the legislative elections, Chen's comments regarding a "new Constitution" and "rectifying the national title" were interpreted by Beijing as being more than just campaign rhetoric.
The fact that the green camp has failed to win a clear majority may delay the time when China will "face facts" and agree to negotiate with the Chen administration. When and under what conditions it might do so will become the most important question that Taiwan will face in the coming year. And as to whether the two sides of the Strait will actually be able to sit at the negotiating table as Chen suggests, the role of the US will be decisive, and this in turn will depend to a very large degree on the level of trust the current US administration places in Chen.
Economic development is Taiwan's life's blood, and the relatively poor performance of the economy under the DPP administration over the past four years has been a source of dissatisfaction for many. The "Rice Bomber" and the question over orange prices in the run-up to the legislative elections raised public concern and added emphasis to Taiwan's inadequate policies in relation to agriculture and the wealth gap.
The DPP and the new legislature will also have to look into unemployment, finances and balancing the budget, and its industrial policy as a matter of urgency. As for Taiwan's international trade and competitiveness, this will face increasing pressure with the prospects of "ASEAN + 1" and "ASEAN + 3" and the question of the direct links will also have to be a priority as soon as the two sides of the Strait meet at the negotiating table.
Returning to domestic politics, this election has resulted in some minor adjustments to the political map for the green and blue camps. Both in terms of votes and the number of seats won and lost, their distribution, and shifts in Changhua County and Taichung County, it will be worth noting how this affects the overall distribution of the "blue north and green south."
Moreover, with the election of the Seventh Legislature in three years' time, the number of legislative seats will be reduced by half and a "single-member district, two-vote system" will be adopted. This means that if all the winning candidates elected this year wish to stand for re-election for the Seventh Legislative Yuan, half of them will be out of a job.
This massive change in the electoral system will impact on the political environment, the operation of factions and regional interests, the allocation of seats and the future development of party politics. For the legislators who have just been elected, this means that the way they manage their constituencies will have to be very different from before.
The influence of this legislative election is not confined to a redistribution of legislative seats among members of various political parties. As the blue camp has retained its majority, the political environment will remain unchanged in respect to the fact that political maneuvering will play an important part in the political process.
In the Legislature, the green and the blue camps must find a way to replace confrontation with competition to jointly promote the nation's development. If this is not done, and the legislative boycotts that have paralyzed the government continue, Taiwan's prospects will be even darker than they were before. But in the face of pressure from China and the US, and the challenges posed by the global environment, we must ask what kind of road will the DPP government and the blue camp in the legislature lead the people of Taiwan along?
The whole world is watching.
Wang Yeh-lih is a professor of political science at Tunghai University.
Translated by Perry Svensson and Ian Bartholomew
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